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  Digital Rights Management (DRM) has been hailed as the solution to illegal 
copying and distribution of digital movies. It employs many different kinds of 
mechanisms, such as encryption, watermarking, and digital fingerprinting, to provide 
a protection system to these high-valued digital assets. Not only to managing 
content’s access control and its usage rights, a DRM system also provides a forensics 
tracking device called digital fingerprint. However, digital fingerprinting always 
assumes the trustworthiness of content provider, and thus may cause customers to be 
subjects of framing and false implication. Complete control over the generation, 
insertion, and detection process enables the content provider to easily reproduce the 
content copy sent to a user, which can be then used to accuse a user of an unlawful act 
he did not do.  
 This customer’s right problem was successfully tackled by the concept of 
Buyer-Seller Watermarking Protocol, which accommodates the rights of both seller 
and buyer. Besides the normal digital fingerprint, another special mark, which is 
hidden from both involved parties, is inserted into the content, so that seller is unable 
to reproduce a buyer’s copy and, at the same time, buyer does not have the capability 
to remove the special mark. 
  Unfortunately, every existing buyer-seller watermarking protocol either fails 
or relies on the trustworthiness of Watermark Certification Authority (WCA) to solve 
the customer’s right problem. The involvement of WCA is required to generate and 
ensure the validity of watermark used in every transaction. As these protocols were, in 
the first place, assembled to eliminate the assumption on seller’s honesty, a 
requirement of a new trusted third party is undesirable. 
iv 
  We address this issue by proposing three buyer-seller watermarking protocols 
that do not require the participation of a WCA. The watermark generator role is 
shifted to either customer or content provider, while still ensuring the validity of 
watermark used. The first protocol, a variant of Memon and Wong’s protocol, 
depends on permutation and privacy homomorphic cryptosystem to conceal the 
watermark inserted. The use of watermark invariant to permutation is avoided by a 
watermark-validity checking. In the second protocol, customer’s right problem is 
tackled by employing homomorphic encryption system and two kinds of 
permutations. The validity of watermark is guaranteed as it is generated by content 
provider. In the third protocol, substitution, instead of permutation, is used along with 
homomorphic cryptosystem to achieve the secrecy of watermark inserted. The 
problem of invariant watermark does not exist since the protocol uses no permutation. 
Consequently, the three buyer-seller watermarking protocols proposed 
guarantee that the content provider has no way to reproduce the content copy a 
customer receives and a customer is, by no means, able to remove the watermark 
without rendering the content useless. 
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 1. INTRODUCTION 
Piracy has always been an issue to resolve in film industry. Illegal reproduction and 
distribution following unauthorized interception while films are on distribution chain 
from movie studios to theaters, and then to viewers, have been robbing content 
providers of what actually belongs to them. When analog media was reigning, 
although illicit copying had been causing movie studios a big revenue loss, it used to 
be less threatening, due to the inferior quality of the result. The complex and 
expensive nature of the copying process limited the quantity of illicit copy available 
in the market, whereas poor quality of such copy hindered people from purchasing 
them, giving pirates relatively little benefit from their unlawful deed. 
When the world switched from analog to digital technology, an opportunity 
was opened for film industry to grow as digital technology promises a more 
affordable and easier way to produce and distribute their commercial goods. Digital 
Cinema, referring to production and distribution of a motion picture in a digital format 
along with the use of a digital projector for exhibition purpose [1], promises both 
producers and cinemas a higher presentation quality and a significantly lower 
production and maintenance cost. Since digital movies can be duplicated very easily 
without loss, it is now very simple to produce high quality copies of a movie at a very 
low cost. Another problem in traditional cinema is that film medium deteriorates 
pretty quickly due to repeated use. These degenerated prints have to be replaced in 
order to maintain a good show quality. Digital projection eliminates this problem [26]. 
In addition, the advances in computing and networking technologies have 
enabled high-speed communication throughout the Internet. Alongside this 
communication technology, digital cinema provides a very convenient and fast way to 
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 distribute video content, an easy and immediate access to film libraries, and a strong 
potential for developing new business models [26].  
Nevertheless, digital technology and the widespread use of Internet have 
caused piracy to become a much more serious concern. Unlike in the past, once 
pirates have access to the video data, they can now duplicate and distribute it 
effortlessly. Perfect duplication of digital data not only guarantees the high quality of 
movies distributed to cinemas, but enhances the quality of a pirated copy as well. 
Considering the pervasive use of Internet, which provides a fast and convenient 
communication channel, and the availability of peer-to-peer file sharing systems, like 
Napster, Kazaa, Gnutella, Freenet, etc, it is well understood how easy an illicit copy 
can be distributed extensively to end-users. Internet is also an open insecure channel 
that enables pirates to easily intercept any data sent through it. The motion picture 
industry in the U.S. estimates its revenue loss due to unauthorized duplication and 
redistribution of movies via physical media, like video cassettes, VCDs, DVDs, etc, 
exceeds $3 billion annually [3]. It is also reported that there are 350,000 to 400,000 
illegal movie-downloads done everyday. The revenue loss due to Internet 
redistribution of illicit copies is estimated to be up to $4 billion annually [3].   
Despite all the advantages promised by digital technology, many movie 
studios are still reluctant to make use of these technologies because of this piracy 
threat and the lack of technology that can securely protects their rights upon their 
digital assets. Content creators and owners are concerned about the consequences of 
illegal copying and distribution on a massive scale. Therefore, there is a demand for a 
protection system that can enforce access control and, at the same time, manage the 
content usage rights, such that unauthorized access can be prevented. This protection 
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 system should be able to ensure that a digital movie is played by authorized operators, 
on authorized equipments, and at authorized times only. Simultaneously, it must 
guarantee that only certain actions under certain conditions specified by content 
owner can be performed on the digital content. 
Digital Rights Management (DRM) system has been proposed as the solution 
to the security problem in digital cinema. It is the core system that allows movie 
studios to disseminate their cinematic assets in a secure and restricted way. As content 
owners specify the operations and the conditions under which they can be performed 
on the content, a DRM system will ensure that a digital movie can only be accessed 
according to the rules specified by the producing studio. 
Even though we try to protect digital content from unauthorized access and 
manage its usage rights, all these mechanisms will be ineffectual when the movie is 
converted into analog signal and displayed on a movie screen. No matter how secure 
the access control mechanism is, a digital movie eventually needs to be presented in 
the clear to the viewers. Once digital content is converted to analog signal, it is no 
longer protected and vulnerable to illegal copying. The analog output can be easily 
provided as an input to a camcorder or a DVD recorder. This problem, known as “the 
analog hole” problem, has been responsible for most of illicit copies available at 
large. 
Knowing that any protection systems can never guarantee a perfect security at 
all times, we need another technology for forensic tracking purpose. A unique 
identification should be embedded into each copy of the films, if possible relating the 
content to the people having access to it, in order to enable the copyright owner to 
trace back the source of a piracy act.  In a DRM system, this property is achieved by 
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 inserting a digital fingerprint, a user-specific distinct watermark, into every content 
copy to sell. Digital fingerprints serve as a forensic analysis tool that enables studios 
to identify the pirates upon locating an illicit copy of their movies.    
Unfortunately, digital fingerprinting only supplies right protection to content 
provider and does not protect the rights of customers at all. It always implicitly 
assumes the honesty of content provider and lets content provider completely control 
the fingerprinting process, causing all fingerprinting schemes to be biased and unfair 
to customers. Content provider always knows the exact fingerprint inserted to 
customer’s copy, so he can easily reproduce copies of the content containing a user’s 
fingerprint and illegally redistribute them. As the result, it enables content provider to 
falsely accuse and frame innocent customer. This unpleasant situation defines what 
customer’s right problem is. It is clear that customer’s right problem actually nullifies 
the objective and the purpose of fingerprinting itself. It can cause an irresolvable 
dispute by opening a chance for a malicious user to deny his unlawful act and claim 
that the unauthorized copy was originated from the content provider.  
 To solve this customer’s right problem, the concept of Buyer-Seller 
Watermarking Protocol accommodating the rights of both the buyer and the seller 
was introduced. However, all existing solutions that successfully solve this problem 
rely on the trustworthiness of Watermark Certification Authority (WCA) as a party 
generating the watermark used in every transaction. Since buyer-seller watermarking 
protocol was, in the first place, introduced to eliminate the assumption on seller’s 
honesty, a requirement of a new trusted third party is not desirable. 
We address this issue by proposing three buyer-seller watermarking protocols 
that do not require the participation of other trusted third party, besides the arbiter and 
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 certification authority (CA). We eliminate the involvement of WCA without ignoring 
the reasons why it was initially introduced. In the first protocol, we tackle the problem 
caused by watermark which is invariant to permutation by requiring content provider 
to check the validity of watermark proposed by customer. The second protocol solves 
the problem by shifting back the watermark generation process to content provider. 
Two kinds of permutation are employed to conceal the watermark from both parties. 
The problem of watermark invariant to permutation does not exist in the third 
protocol as no permutation is involved in this protocol. Instead, substitution and 
encryption are used to prevent both parties from knowing the exact watermark 
inserted. 
 The rest of the report is organized as follows. In section 2, we give an 
overview to the notion of digital cinema and its environment. It is followed by a 
glimpse of digital rights management concept adapted to the digital cinema setting in 
section 3. We describe customer’s right problem and buyer-seller watermarking 
protocol in section 4. In section 5, we shall present our own buyer-seller 
watermarking protocols which do not require the presence of watermark certification 
authority. Construction details comprising encryption and watermarking schemes that 
can be used in our protocols are discussed in section 6, whereas security analysis of 







 2. DIGITAL CINEMA 
In general, digital rights management is an abstract concept that can be applied to any 
multimedia content. However, since each type of multimedia data, be it image, audio, 
or video data, has its own characteristics that are unique and distinctive, it is 
advantageous to understand the nature of the digital content to protect and the 
environment in which the system will operate in order to construct a protection 
system with a significant effect. Therefore, in this section we shall discuss key 
properties of a digital movie and a simple distribution model in digital cinema. 
Nevertheless, we might want to first be aware of what digital cinema refers to and 
what the objective of an attack in the context of digital cinema is.  
Various definitions of digital cinema were presented in many different 
publications. In this thesis, digital cinema refers to a combination of production and 
distribution process of a motion picture in a digital format along with the use of a 
digital projector for exhibition purpose [1]. 
In digital cinema, a pirate is a person who illegally reproduces and distributes 
other’s digital content without the content owner’s consent. It is clear that the 
objective of a pirate is to get an access to (newly released) very high value 
entertainment content of a cinematic title, which can later be duplicated and 
redistributed without restriction [26]. A pirate can be either a participant of the 
production or distribution process (an insider) or a person who is totally not involved 
(an outsider). While most of researchers have been emphasizing their works on 
protection system against outsider attacks, it is reported that 77% of illegal movie 
samples are originally leaked out by industry insiders [3]. Thus, building a protection 
system against these insider attacks is equally important.   
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 2.1 Digital Movie  
There are actually many factors that distinguish digital movie from other multimedia 
data. Nonetheless, we are going to discuss only some of those characteristics which 
are deemed to be relevant in a process of constructing a digital right protection 
system. 
The first distinctive characteristic that a digital movie has is its huge volume. 
Compared to audio and image, video data has much larger size and contains more 
redundancy. The redundancy is caused by the high degree of similarity between 
neighboring video frames and the overlapping information they share. Furthermore, 
for the purpose of providing a high quality show, we are dealing with video data 
which is of higher spatial resolution, causing it to need even larger storage. Knowing 
this fact, we can easily see why compression plays a vital role in digital cinema.  
In order to get a clearer idea on how big the volume of a digital movie is, let 
us illustrate it with an example from [1]. Consider a movie stored at 24 frames per 
second, each frame consists of 1024 rows and 1280 columns, and each pixel is stored 
with 10 bits each of red, blue, and green. A two-hour movie would require almost 800 
Gigabytes plus maybe 10% audio. After compression, the size is reduced to the range 
of 50-100 Gigabytes while still maintaining sufficient fidelity. In fact, this number 
does not well picture the real situation in digital cinema. In this example, those 
numbers represent 1K spatial resolution, whereas in practice a movie distributed to 
theaters should have spatial resolution of 2K to 4K. 
The second feature differentiating a digital movie from other multimedia is its 
value curve. When it is first released, a movie has an extremely high value. This 
initial value can be up to hundreds million dollars. However, it never lasts long, it 
7 
 declines very rapidly after few weeks from its release date. It is reported that the value 
can go down by millions of dollars in one day. For example, DreamWorks’ Shrek 2 
grossed about US$270 millions dollars within the first two week of its release in the 
U.S. [51]. However, it made only about US$100 millions dollars during the next two 
weeks, which indicates more than 60% decrement from that in the first two weeks. 
Overall, Shrek 2 managed to make 83.5% of its total revenue of US$436.722 millions 
within one month of its release in the U.S. Please refer to figure 1 for the value curve 

























Figure 1. Value curve of the movie Shrek 2  
 
From the graph shown above, it is clear that the biggest part of total exhibition 
revenue is made during the first few weeks after the movie is released. As the 
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 consequence of this unique characteristic, we can deduce that the time span during 
which protection system is crucial is very limited. Piracy threat must be handled much 
more seriously during this critical range.  
Another important aspect that should be taken into consideration when 
designing a digital assets protection system in digital cinema, although it is not unique 
to video data only, is the fact that digital content can be effortlessly copied, altered, 
and distributed in a relatively short time. The fact that a lossless, if not exactly the 
same, copy of digital content can be easily produced, not only benefits content 
providers, but assists pirates to produce illegal copies of good quality as well. 
Protection system must be designed in a way, such that the illegal copying will result 
in a drastically degraded quality video. 
 
2.2 Distribution Model in Digital Cinema 
From the studio, a movie must be distributed to the theaters to be able to be enjoyed 
by the viewers. The knowledge about the distribution process is important in deciding 
how the protection system should work. The distribution model we are going to 
present is adopted from Liu et al.’s work [34]. 
Usually there are four parties involved in a basic distribution process, they are 
content provider, distributor, consumer, and clearinghouse. In real life, there might be 
an e-commerce system integrated to the distribution system to handle the financial 
payment and to trigger the function of clearinghouse. This system normally involves 
another party. Nevertheless, it is outside the scope of the project and will not be 
explained further in this thesis. 
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 ● Content Provider is the digital rights owner of the digital content, who wants to 
protect these rights of theirs against the act of piracy. In the context of digital 
cinema, content providers will be movie studios who produce the films.  
● Distributor is a party who provides the distribution channels for digital content to 
be delivered from content providers to consumers. Upon receiving the digital 
content, distributors create a catalogue presenting the content and the right 
metadata for the content promotion. 
● Consumer is a party who accesses and uses the digital content. Consumers obtain 
the digital content from the distributors and buy licenses to access the content 
from clearinghouse. In the context of digital cinema, consumers correspond to 
movie theaters where digital movies are shown to the viewers.  
● Clearinghouse is a party who handles digital licensing by issuing and controlling 
the rights to access the content. Clearinghouse issues a digital license in exchange 
with consumer’s payment. Royalty fees and distribution fees will then be paid to 
the content provider and the distributor, respectively. 
 
Clearinghouse is not necessarily a separated body; sometimes it can be 
combined with the distributor or the content provider itself. In that case, the 
responsibility of handling digital licensing will be shifted to the corresponding party. 
Please refer to figure 2 for a typical distribution model in digital cinema. The diagram 
of the distribution model is a modified version of diagram of DRM model presented 




Figure 2. Distribution model in digital cinema 
 
The distribution process usually flows in the following way:   
First, the content provider encodes the digital content and then packs it for the 
preparation of distribution process. Subsequently, the digital content is transferred to 
the distributor, whereas the usage rules are sent to the clearinghouse. Consumer will 
then get the digital content from the distributor and request for a valid license from 
the clearinghouse. Upon receiving a license request, the clearinghouse will 
authenticate the consumer. Only after verifying consumer’s identity and receiving 
consumer’s payment, a digital license indicating the usage rules and the rights given 
to the corresponding consumer is sent to the requesting consumer. The consumer will 
now be able to access the digital content according to the usage rules specified by the 
content provider. As the digital content moves from the content provider to the 
consumer, the payment moves in the opposite direction, that is from the consumer to 
the content provider.  
The distribution model explained above is a simplified form of the real world 
situation. In real life, as digital cinema involves a vast market, scattered all over the 
world, the distribution process is done in a multi-layered manner and the digital 
content must go through a chain of distributors before it can reach the consumer. As 
the result, distribution process can be pictured as a tree-like hierarchy. Figure 3 
11 
 displays an example of this tree-like hierarchy. This figure is adapted from Kirovski et 
al.’s work [26]. 
 
Figure 3. An example of distribution hierarchy 
 
Besides that, unlike illustrated in our distribution model, in reality digital 
cinema involves a large number of content providers, distributors, and a huge number 
of movie theaters and their multiple projectors. However, compared to other 
applications, like video/audio broadcast, music-on-demand, and video-on-demand, the 
set of participants in digital cinema context is relatively smaller (several hundred 
thousand projectors worldwide versus tens, or even hundreds of millions of satellite 
TV receivers)[26].  
  Another aspect differentiating digital cinema to other applications is the 
playback device. Compared to those used in other applications, the projectors used by 
movie theaters are much more costly because they contain expensive optical 
equipments which are functional in guaranteeing a high quality show. Together with 
the relatively smaller set of participants, this fact allows content providers to 
implement a more sophisticated protection system without causing a significant 
increase to the total cost. 
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 3. DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT IN DIGITAL CINEMA 
In this section, an introduction to the notion of Digital Rights Management (DRM) 
will be first given, followed by the requirements of a DRM system in digital cinema 
and some works that have been done in this area. A short description and the 
objectives of DRM are presented in the first part of this section. The second part of 
this section explains the eight properties that are demanded from a DRM system in 
digital cinema. In the last part of this section, we will give an overview of some ideas 
proposed by many different researchers to solve the movie piracy problem.  
 
3.1 DRM: Definition and Objectives  
To date, there has not been standardization of the definition of Digital Rights 
Management (DRM). DRM is defined in many different ways in the literatures; some 
of the definitions are listed below: 
● The Association of American Publishers defines DRM as the technologies, tools, 
and processes that protect intellectual property during digital content commerce 
[20]. 
● According to Eindhorn, DRM entails the operation of a control system that can 
monitor, regulate, and price each subsequent use of a computer file that contains 
media content, such as video, audio, photo, or text [20]. 
● Gordon describes DRM as a system of information technology (IT) components 
and services that strive to distribute and control digital products [20].  
● Emmanuel and Kankanhalli define DRM as a set of technologies and approaches 
that establish a trust relationship among the parties involved in a digital asset 
creation and transaction [21]. 
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 Although those definitions have various ways of phrasing in describing DRM, 
they basically share a common idea. In general, DRM refers to a system that protects 
high-value digital assets by controlling the distribution and usage rights of those 
digital assets.   
From its definition, we can deduce that the objectives of a DRM system are as 
follows: 
● To ensure secure distribution of the content and to avoid attackers from 
intercepting the content while being delivered from one point to another in the 
distribution chain. 
● To enforce access control on the digital content and to prevent unauthorized 
access to the content. 
● To protect the copyrights of the digital content and to avoid illegal copying and 
distribution of the content. 
● To manage content usage rights and to ensure that access to digital content is 
allowed only under the conditions specified by the content owner. 
 
The core concept used in DRM is the separation between the digital content 
and the rights ruling the content access. Instead of buying the digital content, the 
consumer purchases a digital license granting certain access rights to him. A digital 
license is a digital data file that specifies certain usage rules for the digital content 
[34]. The idea is to allow protected content to be distributed without restriction and to 
ensure that this protected content is nothing, but garbage without the presence of a 
valid digital license. As the consequence, the protection and distribution of the content 
can be separated from those of the rights. 
14 
 3.2 DRM Requirements in Digital Cinema 
As mentioned in Section 2, digital rights management generally can be applied to any 
multimedia content. Nevertheless, every application has different set of requirements 
to fulfill. Consequently, DRM must be adjusted specifically according to the 
requirements demanded by the application in order to achieve maximum result. In this 
section, we shall see the requirements that a DRM system should satisfy in the context 
of digital cinema. The list of requirements presented below is accustomed in line with 
the characteristics of digital movie and distribution model presented in the previous 
section. 
Basically, all the requirements of DRM in digital cinema can be classified into 
eight major groups: concealment, access control, content usage rights management, 
forensic tracking, quality of service, efficiency, scalability, and renewability. Each of 
these eight requirements is explained elaborately below. 
 
3.2.1 Concealment and Content Protection 
Concealment is responsible for nullifying an attack in which a pirate tries to intercept 
the digital content while it is being distributed from the movie studios to the movie 
theaters. The content should be protected in such a way, so that attacker will not be 
able to access the content, even though he successfully intercepts the protected 
content. A DRM system must ensure that the protected content has no value and 
appears random without the appropriate secret key. In other words, it should be 
useless for user to steal protected content without stealing the secret key locking it. 
As pirates may try to steal digital content at any stage of the distribution 
process, the content protection system must be persistent, i.e. it has to stay with the 
15 
 content wherever it goes. The content must be protected not only while it is being 
transferred on an insecure channel from one party to another, but also when it is in 
transit from one distribution stage to the next. Thus, we also require each party 
involved in the distribution process to be a secure repository for protected content 
with capability of securely performing: 
● Authentication: to ensure that the party interacting with them is indeed a 
legitimate party as well. 
● Rights management (licensing): to prevent unauthorized user from accessing the 
content and to ensure that every user can only perform actions that are specified in 
their licenses. 
● Content encryption and decryption: to prevent pirates from getting an access to the 
unprotected content, although he successfully steals the protected content from the 
repository. 
● Fingerprint embedding and detection: to provide a pirate-tracking tool. 
● Integrity checking: to prevent the protected content from being tampered with by 
an attacker. 
 
In order to further tighten the security, each party involved should employ a 
tamper-resistance mechanism, either tamper-resistance hardware or software, in their 
systems, so that the cost of initial attack increases and pirates are deterred from 
stealing the protected content. 
It is also important to ensure that the protection system is embedded into the 
content itself and not into its header. The fields in the file headers are often static, and 
therefore they can be guessed from information in the bit stream, or they can even be 
16 
 ignored. Hence, a protection system applied to the content header can be easily 
broken by simply discarding the protected header. 
It may seem that the content is safe once we can protect the content in 
accordance with our discussion above, but there is actually one more way for pirate to 
obtain the content without having to break the protection system, the analog hole. No 
matter how secure the protection system is, a digital movie eventually needs to be 
presented transparently to the viewers. As mentioned in the earlier part of the report, 
when a digital movie is converted into analog signal and displayed on a movie screen, 
it is vulnerable to illegal copying. Therefore, besides protecting the digital content, we 
need to protect the analog output as well. A DRM system should be able to tackle this 
problem by ensuring that capturing the analog signal using camcorder will result in a 
severely degraded copy of the content, or even result in a totally random signal. 
 
3.2.2 Access Control 
Access control is an important part of a DRM system that is used to prevent 
unauthorized access to the digital content. In digital cinema, a DRM system should 
help the movie studios to ensure that their movies can only be accessed by authorized 
operators on authorized equipments and at authorized times. Therefore, authentication 
process must take place before a DRM system decides whether or not to give access 
right to an individual. Every access request from an unauthorized user must be turned 
down by the DRM system. Moreover, a DRM system should guarantee that a digital 
movie can only be accessed under certain conditions as well. DRM should provide a 
kind of conditional access to digital content, such that access is only allowed when a 
set of rules has been satisfied.  
17 
 As explained in the previous subsection, the digital content and the digital 
license granting users rights to access the digital content are managed and distributed 
separately. This separation concept is the backbone of the access control in a DRM 
system. Possession of a valid digital license can determine whether an individual has 
the right to access certain digital contents. Usually the protection system providing 
secrecy of the digital content is combined together with the concept of digital license 
in order to enforce access control mechanism. The secret key that can unlock the 
protection system is integrated into the digital license, such that only authorized users 
having valid licenses can access the content. 
Since digital licenses plays such an important role in enforcing access control, 
a secure protection system must also be applied to them. Similar to the content 
protection, a protected license should appear random, such that attackers cannot 
extract any information about the digital license without the corresponding key. The 
protection has to stay with the license both while it is being distributed on an insecure 
channel and while it is being stored by any party involved. Again, it is done in order 
to avoid attackers from learning about the information stored in the digital license 
without first breaking the protection system.  
As the content provider might give different set of rights to each user, a digital 
license received by one user might differ from that of another user. In order to prevent 
attackers from swapping their licenses with a more “powerful” license of others, a 
digital license should be linked to the identity of the owner and it should not be 
transferable to other parties. The clearinghouse, therefore, should perform secure 
authentication before issuing and verifying a digital license in order to get the 
identification of the user and at the same time validate that he is indeed a legitimate 
18 
 user. Besides authentication, integrity checking must also be performed by the 
receiver of the license in order to avoid the license from being tampered with by 
attackers. Last but not least, non-repudiation in right issuing must be enforced to 
prevent illegal right issuing. 
 
3.2.3 Content Usage Rights Management 
Content usage rights need to be managed in order to prevent malicious theaters from 
illegally copying and editing the content. A DRM system must help the movie studios 
to ensure that only certain actions can be performed on their digital movies.  
As the first step of content usage rights management, the content provider 
must specify the set of operations that can be performed on the content and the 
conditions on which they can be carried out before the content is distributed to the 
movie theaters. Unlike the digital license, these action-condition pairs should be 
embedded to the digital content, so that a DRM system can always refer to them 
before granting users a permission to execute the requested operation. Similar to the 
content protection system, the action-condition information should not be embedded 
into the content header. Otherwise, attackers can simply remove the header to break 
the content usage rights management system. 
Once the content usage rights are embedded to the content, it is a DRM 
system’s responsibility to ensure that an action can only be performed on the content 





 3.2.4 Forensic Tracking 
As no protection system can ever guarantee a perfect security at all times, we need 
forensic tracking technology to trace back the source of a piracy act. A unique 
identification should be embedded into each copy of the films, relating the content to 
the people having access to it, in order to enable movie studios to identify the pirates.   
A DRM system should embed this unique identification imperceptibly, such 
that it is impossible, except by guessing, for attackers to locate the positions where the 
unique identification is embedded without knowing the secret key used in the 
embedding process. The marked content must be visually indistinguishable from the 
original copy of the content. Robustness is another important property that a DRM 
system should guarantee. The unique mark should survive common signal processing 
operations, like scaling, cropping, translation, rotation, filtering, noise reduction, and 
change of brightness. In other words, it should be infeasible for attackers to alter or 
remove the unique identification without causing significant damage to the content. 
Therefore, a DRM system should never insert the fingerprint into the content header 
lest pirates discard the header to disable the tracking mechanism.  
In order to guarantee the reliability of the identification code, DRM must 
ensure that the codes are collusion-resistant and frame proof. No coalition of users 
should be able to collude their marked copies in order to erase the identification code. 
Neither should users be able to fabricate the unique identification for the purpose of 
framing innocent users. The forensic tracking mechanism should be designed in a 
way, such that the code detected in an illicit copy always refers to at least one of the 
pirates and never points to an innocent user. Even though some users collaborate and 
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 collude their marked copies, the remaining code should always enable the content 
provider to identify at least one of the pirates. 
Besides preventing a group of malicious users from framing other users, it is 
also important to prevent the content owner from producing fake proof in order to 
accuse an innocent party of a piracy act. 
 
3.2.5 Quality of Service 
In spite of all the technologies employed in a DRM system, quality of service must 
not be affected. Any mechanisms used to provide content protection, access control, 
usage rights management, or pirate tracking should have an insignificant impact on 
the visual quality of the digital content. The distortion caused ought to be 
imperceptible, so that the high fidelity of the digital movie is sustained. 
Hindering the viewing experience of the audience should never be an option in 
the movie industry. Therefore, a DRM system has to be constructed with quality 
degradation as the function to be minimized.  
Moreover, a DRM system should ensure that any potential failure, for example 
clearinghouse server breakdown, would not interfere with the ability of the theaters to 
exhibit the movies and detract from the paying viewer’s experience. 
 
3.2.6 Efficiency 
Efficiency measures the practicability of a DRM system. We do not want to use a 
system that takes million years to process a movie, uses all the storage available in 
this world, or costs us more than the value of the content itself. Hence, we should 
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 limit the amount of space, time, and money used to implement a DRM system. The 
smaller amount of resources a DRM system needs, the more feasible it is.  
As mentioned in the earlier part of this thesis, a digital movie has a huge 
volume, and thus compression has an important part to play in digital cinema. In order 
to achieve storage efficiency, any mechanism deployed in a DRM system should have 
a limited impact on the compression ratio. These technologies should not cause the 
compression to become ineffective by introducing more redundancy than the 
compression algorithm can eliminate. 
Because of the security mechanisms, a digital movie must now be 
preprocessed before it can be played on the screen. In order to maintain the quality of 
the show and to stream the movie in a smooth continuous manner, we require those 
security mechanisms to have a real-time performance. The amount of time consumed 
to apply the security mechanisms on the content is also crucial in the distribution 
process. Since the content provider needs to send a great number of copies to a great 
number of movie theaters, a DRM system with a non-polynomial processing time is 
simply undesirable. 
In terms of finances, the implementation of DRM should not cause a 
significant increase in the production, distribution, exhibition, and maintenance cost. 
It must be guaranteed that the total cost does not exceed the value of the digital 
content itself, because there is no one in this world who would spend $1 million to 
protect a $100K asset. So far, a high price to pay is one reason why movie studios are 




 3.2.7 Scalability 
Scalability of a DRM system is defined as the flexibility of the system’s network to be 
expanded or shrunk upon changing the set of participants. In digital cinema, the set of 
parties involved in the distribution process of a cinematic title might be different from 
that of another title. Movies which are more popular have larger distribution network, 
whereas less popular movies have typically smaller distribution network. As the set of 
participants changes every time movie studios want to distribute a digital content, 
total reconstruction of the DRM system and key management for each change is 
definitely not desirable. 
It should cost little effort, time, and money to adjust the DRM system to such 
changes. Movie theaters and distributors should be able to join and leave the system’s 
network without messing up the whole rights protection system. At the same time, the 
content provider should not need to restructure the whole DRM system after expelling 
a party from the network. In other words, a DRM system should be flexible to the 
network resizing without compromising the security aspect of the system.  
 
3.2.8 Renewability 
Renewability indicates the ability of a DRM system to recover after a successful 
attack. Again, no system can provide perfect security. Eventually, attacker will 
succeed in finding a way to break the protection system. Thus, renewability does 
matter in designing a digital right protection system. 
The protection system must be designed in a way, such that the impact of an 
attack is localized. The content provider should be able to isolate the part of the 
system that has been compromised, so that it will not affect the other parts of the 
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 system. It is also vital to guarantee that by successfully breaking the protection 
system, an attacker can only obtain an access to a very limited number of cinematic 
titles (one is the best). 
Furthermore, it is important to ensure that the system can be renewed within a 
very short period of time using very little resources in an effortless manner. The 
system should be able to resume immediately after a successful attack and the total 
cost the content provider needs to pay to recover the system from a compromise 
should be as small as possible. A thorough system restructuring should be avoided as 
well.  
 
After discussing the ideal situation desired in digital cinema, it is easy to see that 
DRM is a very complex system. No single technology could stand alone to satisfy all 
the requirements. Instead, we need to combine several security concepts and many 
solutions together in order to make a maximum contribution. Some common 
technologies employed in DRM systems are encryption, watermarking, digital 
fingerprinting, message authentication code (MAC), and digital signature.  
 
3.3 Related Works  
In this subsection, we shall see some works that have been done in order to build a 
DRM system in digital cinema. Overview of the contribution made by each work will 





 3.3.1 DRM in Digital Cinema 
Many research works [1][26][30][31][33][34] agreed that the combination of 
encryption and digital watermarking is the solution to the rights management 
problem. Encryption is used to provide the concealment property by protecting the 
digital content while being distributed to users. At the same time, encryption enforces 
access control on the content by allowing only users having the right decryption key 
to access the content. The distribution of decryption key to the users is done by 
implementing the concept of digital license. Digital license containing the decryption 
key is delivered to the users after their payment is received. In order to prevent 
malicious users from misusing the license, digital watermark stating the action-
condition pairs allowed to be performed on the content is embedded to the content. 
Each time the playback device receives a user request to access the content, it will 
check the conditions stated in the watermark before deciding whether the access right 
will be granted to the requesting user. A unique user-specific watermark, also known 
as a digital fingerprint, is embedded to the content, so that the content provider can 
keep track every copy of the content distributed to the users. A digital fingerprint is 
also used as a forensic tracking tool whenever the content provider successfully 
locates an illicit copy. Unfortunately, even though these works proposed a set of 
technologies that can be employed in DRM, they did not specifically explain how 
each technology should be applied on the content. 
Besides explaining how encryption and watermarking can be useful in DRM, 
Liu et al. [34] presented a DRM model involving four parties: the content provider, 
the distributor, the clearinghouse, and the consumer. They pointed out that digital 
license is the core concept of DRM and illustrated how digital license concept is 
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 applied in a DRM system. Some cryptographic mechanisms mentioned in this work 
are symmetric/asymmetric encryption, digital signature, one-way hash function, and 
digital certificates. Tamper resistance technology is also mentioned as the 
supplementary security mechanism. They closed with a brief explanation on privacy, 
fair use, and usability concerns.  
Bloom [1], not only discussed about encryption and watermarking, but also 
addressed the “analog hole” problem. He mentioned that embedding watermark to the 
content could not solve this problem unless all camcorder producers agree to integrate 
a watermark detector to their devices. Instead, he suggested camcorder jamming, a 
technology to interfere with the ability of camcorder to record a movie in a theater, as 
a better solution to this problem. 
In order to protect the integrity of digital license, Kirovski et al. [26] suggested 
appending the hash value of the content and license, which is signed by the 
distributor, to the digital license, so that it can be verified before accessing the 
content. Moreover, they mentioned briefly about employing error-correcting code to 
construct a fingerprinting scheme that is collusion-resistant and frame proof. A special 
kind of error-correcting codes is used to provide a set of fingerprints to embed. These 
codes are designed in a specific way, so that by colluding a subset of codewords, it 
will result in neither another codeword (frame other user) nor a zero vector (erase the 
fingerprint). However, this approach is only effective for small number of users. As 
the number of users grows, this method becomes impractical.  
In addition to explanation on general concept of encryption and watermarking 
in DRM, Linnartz et al. [33] proposed the use of physical mark on the media where an 
authorized copy is stored in order to prevent playback devices from playing an illicit 
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 copy resulted from camcorder copying. Playback devices must match the watermark 
embedded in the content with the physical mark before granting user an access to the 
content. They also suggested a method to enable user to copy the content for limited 
number of times, which they called the ticket concept. Let m be the number of copy 
operations allowed to be performed on the content. The results of passing a random 
number through a cryptographic one-way function F, n and n-m times, denoted by W 
and T respectively, are embedded to the content. Every time a user requests for a right 
to copy the content, playback device checks if ( )p TF  is equal to W for some . 
If yes, copy operation can be carried out, and then T will be changed to 
0p >
( )F T . 
Otherwise, the request will be rejected. However, physical mark concept does not 
allow user to copy the content at all, and their copy generation control does not stop 
users from making unlimited number of copies using camcorder.  
After giving a brief explanation on Potato system that convinces customers to 
pay for digital contents because of the advantages and provision promised for paying 
customers, Grimm and Aichroth [24] introduced the concept of Lightweight DRM 
(LWDRM) that relies on the responsible behavior of the customers. LWDRM 
involves two file formats: local media file (LMF) and signed media file (SMF). After 
making the payment, customer will receive LMF file from content provider, which 
consists of the content encrypted using AES and the key encrypted using customer’s 
public key. Thus, this type of file cannot be transferred outside of the receiving 
device. A user can transfer the content by first producing its corresponding SMF file, 
which consists of encrypted and watermarked content and the key “signcrypted” using 
his private key. This deters users from transferring the content illegally as it contains 
his signature. To address privacy issue, Grim and Aichroth suggested the use of 
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 pseudonyms as customer identifiers. Nonetheless, this method does not protect the 
content from camcorder recording.   
Byers et al. [3] classified attacks into two groups: insider and outsider attacks. 
They studied 285 movie samples available on file sharing networks in order to find 
out the source of the leakage and the date of availability of those illegal copies. They 
suggested to define a procedure for tracking where the artifact is at all times, as well 
as who is responsible for it, as a short-term mitigation. They proposed a monitoring 
system done by human resources, allowing access to digital content only with the 
presence of an authorized party, to prevent insider attacks. As medium-term 
mitigation, they proposed the concept of trusted content player, which is tamper 
resistant and acts as a content storage device. A user must enter a one-time password 
to access the content on the trusted device. At playback, the player would project a 
tracking code on top of the content. Although short and medium term mitigations 
were discussed, they did not present any long-term mitigation. They presented their 
proposed solutions at a very abstract level and they did not explain the details of these 
solutions, making them too general to implement. 
Chong et al. [10] proposed the idea of a second level of management and 
control in their Security Attribute Based Digital Rights Management (SABDRM). 
Instead of relating the identity of a user directly to his rights, they proposed the 
concept of security attributes that bridges the identity and the rights of a user. These 
security attributes, which may include role, group membership, time and location to 
access the content, etc, together with the identity of a user determines the contents that 
the user can access and the rights that the user may exercise on the contents. The way 
SABDRM works is highly similar to the standard DRM: the content is distributed in a 
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 protected form and access is enabled only with the presence of a digital license 
containing the decryption key and the set of actions a user can perform on the content. 
Another unique feature of SABDRM is that each copy of content is encrypted using a 
user-specific key, so each user receives different copy of protected content. However, 
except determining the rights that a user has together with the identity of that user, 
security attributes are redundant and useless. They only complicate the system and 
make SABDRM not suitable for large number of participants. Moreover, user-specific 
encryption keys make key management even more complex. Although it can avoid 
collusion and framing problem, it cannot survive camcorder recording. 
Although it is a secure multicast protocol that is presented by Chu et al. [11], 
their work shares some common aspects with DRM. Similar to a DRM system, their 
protocol also relies on the concept of encryption and watermarking to provide access 
control and forensic tracking mechanisms. Each message sent is encrypted, and each 
authorized member will obtain the decryption key from the group leader. In order to 
get the ability to trace back the source of leakage, sender produces two different 
watermarked copies of each frame of the video, encrypt them with different keys, and 
multicast both copies. The group leader will generate unique random string for each 
member to indicate which sequence of watermarked copies that particular user can 
access. So, each user receives a different set of decryption keys. Unfortunately, their 
mechanism can only detect collusions with a small collusion group. Tolerating more 
detection error or generating more watermarked copies for each frame can help, but 




 3.3.2 Video Encryption 
Tosun and Feng [52] proposed a light-weight, multi-layered video encryption 
algorithm that encodes only some parts of the video while still providing reasonable 
degree of security. The video is first processed using 8 8×  block discrete cosine 
transform (DCT) compression. Two breakpoints, loss-tolerant and security 
breakpoints, will be then set to partition the coefficients into 3 groups: base, middle, 
and enhancement layer. Base and middle layer are encrypted using VEA1, while 
enhancement layer is left unprotected. VEA1 divides data into two groups based on a 
secret key, and then XOR operation is carried out between the two groups. The result 
of DES encryption on the second group will be then appended to the result of XOR 
operation to form the ciphertext. This method allows user to adaptively set the 
breakpoints to balance the security and performance according to his need. Tosun and 
Feng also presented an algorithm to determine breakpoints adaptively when a target 
bandwidth rate is provided.  
In 2001, Tosun and Feng [53] proposed another video encryption algorithm. 
This time, an error preserving encryption mechanism is specially designed for 
transmission of video over wireless network. Standard cryptosystem cannot be used to 
protect content sent over wireless network because of their error propagation property 
and the avalanche effect. A single bit error can cause the protected content to be 
decrypted to garbage since they do not preserve the transmission errors. In order to 
solve this problem, Tosun and Feng constructed an encryption system based on the 
concept of error preserving function. If plaintext x and y differ at i positions, then their 
encrypted form, E x  and ( ) ( )E y , also differ at i positions. They explained that this 
kind of functions could be generated using permutation and complementation of a 
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 subset of the bits. This very fast encryption method successfully solves the 
transmission error problem, but it is lack of security property and vulnerable to known 
plaintext attack. 
By presenting a video restoration algorithm based on motion vectors only in 
the beginning of their work, Liu and Li [35] showed that encrypting only pixel data 
residing in I frames is not enough and motion vectors alone are sufficient to restore 
reasonable apprehensible video streaming data that are recognizable by humans. Thus, 
they proposed an algorithm to encrypt these motion vectors residing in P and B 
frames of a video as a complement to the I frame encryption. Their encryption method 
consists of two steps: concealing and distancing. In the first step, motion vectors are 
XOR-ed with a random number to wipe off their static features. Then, the resulting 
vectors are scrambled according to a set of mapping tables to hide their spatial 
relationship. The random number table and mapping tables are re-generated using 
some random number generator controlled by a secret key each time the algorithm is 
invoked. Therefore, the security of their method relies on that of the random number 
generator. As motion vectors consume over half of the video stream bandwidth and 
they encrypt all of them, this method causes a significant overhead to the overall 
encryption performance. 
Based on Claude Shannon’s work, Lookabaugh and Sicker [36] explained how 
selective encryption could even produce better security as it only encrypts important 
part of the data, and thus reduces the amount of material that can be used to attack the 
encryption algorithm. They presented two simple algorithms to illustrate the idea of 
selective encryption. The first algorithm uses a 3-bit scalar quantizer to convert 
continuous valued input to one of the eight possible 3-bit words. Selective encryption 
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 involves scrambling a few most significant bits of those words. In-the-clear portion of 
the stream is statistically independent of the scrambled portion, so it does not help 
attackers to guess the scrambled portion. However, this kind of encryption cannot 
recover the original data perfectly due to some information lost during the 
quantization process. The second method suggested the encryption of a portion of bits 
in the headers of a video data. This method is very fast, but it has serious security 
problem. As the fields in the file headers are often static, they can be guessed from 
information in the bit stream, or they can even be ignored. 
Chiaraluce et al. [7] proposed a video encryption algorithm that uses three 
chaotic functions to encrypt the most significant bit of the DC coefficient of DCT, the 
AC coefficients of the I frames, the sign bit of the AC coefficients of the P frames, 
and the sign bit of the motion vectors. The input and the parameters of the skew tent 
map  and the sawtooth likewise map CM  are generated using a secret key. The 
real numbers produced by  and  are summed up together, and then scaled to 
obtain a number between 1 and 256. This number will be used as the input of the 
logistic map CM . On the input number, CM  is applied 64 times to produce a 
sequence of 512 bits, which will be XOR-ed with the content to produce the 
ciphertext. The chaotic sequence produced by this sequence of operation is quite 
similar to white noise, making the ciphertext appear random as well. Nevertheless, 
this method involves a quite complex set of computations, causing its performance to 




Shieh [48] introduced a video encryption algorithm called Take, Skip, and 
Permute (TSP), which is based on entropy coding. According to his method, the 
content will be first compressed using Huffman entropy coding and encryption starts 
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 only after the compression process is completed. Once the entropy-coded stream is 
produced, starting from the beginning of the stream, a few bits are taken randomly, 
followed by selectively skipping a sequence of bits before the next taking process. 
These taking and skipping process are repeated until we reach the end of the stream. 
The permutation process will then take place to shuffle all those chosen bits. So, after 
the permutation process, the stream is partly scrambled. The positions of chosen bits, 
the number of bits to skip, and the permutation table are all controlled by a secret key. 
Although this method is very simple and fast, it is vulnerable to known plaintext 
attack. If both plaintext and ciphertext are known, attackers can try to observe the 
difference and guess the three parameters controlling the encryption.  
Zeng and Lei [57] proposed a frequency domain video encryption system, in 
which video data are concealed by employing bit and block scrambling. The input 
video signal is first transformed into frequency domain and decomposed into 
subbands by performing 2D wavelet transform. The sign bit and refinement bits of 
each coefficient which are not highly compressible are selected for scrambling. Then, 
each subband is divided into a number of blocks of the same size. Within each 
subband, these blocks of coefficients are shuffled. In order to further improve the 
security, each block of coefficient can be replaced by one of its eight rotated versions. 
The result of this rotation process is the ciphertext of the corresponding input. The bit 
scrambling, block shuffling, and block rotation operations are all controlled by a 
secret key. Zeng and Lei also mentioned that an 8 8×  block based DCT can be used 
instead. After dividing the coefficients into segments, DC and AC coefficients within 
each segment are scrambled. The sign bits are also encrypted by flipping the sign 
randomly or with respect to a threshold. These scrambling and sign flipping can be 
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 applied only on the I frames and I blocks in the P/B frames to reduce the computation 
complexity. To avoid motion vectors from leaking some information about the video, 
their signs can be encrypted in the same way.  
 
3.3.3 Digital Watermarking 
Digital watermarking is a technique for embedding a message into a digital content by 
imperceptibly modifying the content. Readers might want to refer to [15] for an 
overview to digital watermarking concept. Some existing watermarking techniques 
are presented below.    
Dittman et al. [16] presented a watermarking classification dividing 
watermarks into five groups based on their application area. Two types of watermarks 
mentioned, fingerprint and copy control watermarks, play a very important role in a 
DRM system. They later described the requirements of each class of watermarks with 
respect to six properties of digital watermarking and several types of possible attacks 
for each class. Both fingerprint and copy control watermarks require high robustness, 
high security, and imperceptibility. However, fingerprint watermarks have higher 
complexity and its detection uses non-blind method, whereas copy control 
watermarks should have low complexity and its detection should be done blindly. In a 
blind watermarking technique, watermark detection can be done in the absence of the 
original unwatermarked content, whereas a non-blind technique requires the presence 
of the original unwatermarked content in the detection process. They also mentioned 
about StirMark Benchmark, an automated evaluation architecture for multimedia 
watermarking. The idea is to put different watermarking methods to a series of tests 
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 and attacks, followed by the detection process, to measure the reliability of each 
method. 
Wessely et al. [56] proposed a video watermarking algorithm that uses a two-
dimensional discrete wavelet transform (DWT) based on the simple Haar-wavelet. 
DWT approach is chosen as the result of an extensive benchmark showed that it 
achieved the highest robustness, whereas Haar-wavelet is selected because its low- 
and high-pass filters are computationally inexpensive to implement. According to 
their method, the watermark is embedded into the 3LH
3
 horizontal high-pass subband 
of the blue color channel with a set of twelve Walsh-series as the carrier. The 
detection can be done blindly by estimating the watermark bit with respect to the 
correlation between the Walsh pattern and the LH  coefficients. To further improve 
the robustness against attack like deletion, duplication, or swapping of video images, 
they suggested an idea of embedding more than one copy of the watermark. The 
concept of content adaptive energies was also proposed to improve robustness without 
causing any perceptible visual artifacts. 
The watermarking scheme proposed by Cheng and Huang [5] first applies the 
pyramid transform to preprocess the I frames of the video. Pyramid transform is 
adopted for its multiresolution, low complexity, good prediction, and easy control of 
embedding errors. The watermark is embedded in the pyramid transform domain with 
the modulation magnitude that is maximized under the fidelity constraints to achieve 
the best robustness and detectability. Optimum decision rule derived using the 
statistical model of the generalized Gaussian distribution is used to detect the 
embedded watermarks blindly. Experiments demonstrated that their watermarking 
scheme has low visual distortion, high robustness, and accurate detection.  
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 In [38], Lubin et al. proposed a forensic digital watermarking system to enable 
content provider to trace back the source of piracy act. They first pointed out that 
unlike the other types of watermark, detection of forensic watermark could be done 
with the presence of the original video and detection need not be performed in real-
time as detection is only done occasionally by the content provider. They achieved the 
robustness and imperceptibility properties by restricting the watermark pattern to be 
very low frequency in both space and time. The high degree of information in the low 
frequency components makes them difficult to distort without degrading the fidelity. 
At the same time, human beings are insensitive to low frequency distortions, 
guaranteeing imperceptibility of the watermarks. They chose the carriers based on the 
concept of sub-threshold summation, such that inserting one of them would not cause 
any visual artifacts, but inserting many of them would produce visible distortions. 
They mentioned that the concept of error-correcting codes could further improve the 
security of their method.   
Lu et al. [37] introduced the concept of video frame dependent watermark 
(VFDW) in order to achieve robustness against two kinds of watermark estimation 
attacks (WEAs), collusion and copy attacks. Collusion attack tries to remove 
watermark by colluding video frames with the same watermark, whereas copy attack 
tries to embed a watermark to unmarked video. In digital cinema, copy attack can be 
performed to attack fingerprint watermarks by embedding a watermark that frames 
innocent user. Accurate watermark estimation, in terms of both polarity and energy, is 
an indispensable component to achieve effective WEAs, so they proposed the use of 
video frame dependent hash, called frame hash, as part of the embedded watermark. 
The original watermark is merged with the frame hash using a shuffling function 
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 working based on a secret key to obtain the VFDW, which is then embedded to the 
content. Because of the frame hash, averaging method to estimate embedded 
watermark does not work. Collusion attack now results in degraded video and copy 
attack causes a distortion without successfully forging a watermark.   
 
3.3.4 Digital Fingerprinting 
Kundur and Karthik [27] proposed a method that combined the process of video 
fingerprinting and video encryption in order to construct an effective and efficient 
protection system. The idea is to encrypt the video with a key, which is the same for 
all users, and then send a set of slightly different decryption keys to users. The 
decryption process using many different keys would result in decrypted copies that 
are slightly different for each user. The difference between those copies would act as 
a forensic tracking mean. They used DCT to first process the raw data, and then the 
video is partially encrypted by sign-scrambling only a chosen subset of the resulting 
coefficients. Each user will receive the same encrypted content, but will be given a 
unique subset of keys for decrypting only a fraction of the encrypted coefficients. The 
locations and the sign bits of the remaining concealed subset are hidden from the 
receiving user and constitute the digital fingerprint in his copy. In order to achieve the 
robustness against collusion attack, they design a different set of common hidden 
encrypted coefficients for each combination of users, so that it can uniquely determine 
the exact colluding members when collusion attack happens. Using this method, they 
successfully cut down the amount of computation and the bandwidth requirement as 
the content needs to be encrypted once only and only one version of the content needs 
to be transmitted to all users. Nevertheless, their method is still susceptible to key 
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 collusion attack and requires the video features being decrypted made known to users, 
making the encryption less secure.  
 Schonberg and Kirovski [46] proposed a phase-shifted spread-spectrum 
fingerprinting as a solution to the analog hole problem. They embed the fingerprint, 
defined as a spread-spectrum sequence of independent identically and uniformly 
distributed random samples, in the DCT domain of the video frames. For each 
coefficient, they consider the DCT coefficients with the same index from the 
neighboring DCT blocks within frames as well as within some preceding and 
succeeding frames, and compute the standard deviation of those coefficients to 
determine the magnitude of the fingerprint. The fingerprint will be then smoothly 
transitioned across those frames. In order to improve imperceptiveness, low 
frequency/high energy DCT coefficients are not marked. They also introduced the 
concept of pilot fingerprints for fast detection. Schonberg and Kirovski pointed out 
that the collusion resistance of their methods is constant, invariant to the content size. 
Nonetheless, their methods are only effective for collusion of very small size (1 or 2) 
and require a fingerprint that is sufficiently long. Additionally, they cannot resist the 
gradient attack. 
 Under the Marking Assumption, which says that by colluding users can only 
detect a mark if it differs in their copies and users cannot change the undetected marks 
without rendering the content useless, Boneh and Shaw [2] showed how to construct a 
c-frameproof code, a code that prevents the colluding users from framing an innocent 
user, and a c-secure code, a code that enables content provider to trace back an illegal 
copy to the source of piracy act in the presence of c users colluding, using error-
correcting codes. For both kinds of codes, they first show a simple code satisfying the 
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 desired property with length that is linear to the number of users, then together with 
an error-correcting code, it is used as an alphabet for the construction of new codes 
with shorter length. Boneh and Shaw also showed how to identify the colluding users 
when their codes are employed. Despite the effectiveness of their codes to deal with 
collusion attack, the length of those codes is still too large, which is polymonial to the 
maximum number of colluding users and logarithmic to the total number of users. 
 Trappe et al. [54] introduced the concept of balanced incomplete block design 
(BIBD) to construct an anti-collusion code with length equal to the square root of the 
number of users. The basic idea is to design a set of codewords such that each 
combination of codewords with certain size shares a unique subset of ones. They also 
proposed subgroup-based construction to decrease the computation requirement 
needed to identify colluders by grouping together users that are likely to collude into 
one group and assigning to each group a different anti-collusion code. As the result, it 
reduces the amount of computation and increases the detection statistics when 
colluders come from the same subgroup. However, this method decreases the ability 
to detect colluders from different subgroups. Since it is difficult to predict the correct 
way of grouping, this construction is not very useful. In spite of its shorter length, the 
code proposed by Trappe et al. only works in CDMA signaling and not in orthogonal 
signaling. They also assume that when fingerprints are averaged, the resulting 
message is the logical AND of those codewords, which is not true.  
 Another fingerprinting scheme which is based on error-correcting code was 
proposed by Ferrer and Joancomarti in [19]. Their embedding process starts with the 
compression of the content using JPEG algorithm. Every pixel in the compressed 
form will be compared to that of the uncompressed one in order to determine the 
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 positions where marks will be embedded. The fingerprints will be encoded using an 
error-correcting code before being embedded to the content. The special marks are 
embedded only into pixels where the compressed and uncompressed contents differ. 
Detection process can be done easily by reversing the embedding process with the 
presence of the original content. Ferrer and Joancomarti showed that dual Hamming 
code can be used for encoding in the embedding process in order to deal with 
collusion attack involving two users. Although their method is relatively simpler, their 
fingerprinting scheme is not robust against random geometric distortions and 
combinations of basic image processing operations. Beside that, their method can 
only resist collusions of size two using a code of which length is linear to the number 
of users. 
 The other codes that have been used to deal with collusion attack are binary 
sorted code [32] and Reed Solomon code [55]. Lindkvist [32] showed that binary 
linear code and coset of binary linear code can only be used to resist collusions 
consisting of at most two users. She explained that for collusions of size larger than 
two, colluders can choose randomly an odd number of their codewords and then 
perform Modulo Two strategy to form another codeword which is not in the set of 
colluders’ codewords. Modulo Two strategy is carried out by choosing the bit that 
appears an odd number of times at every position. She then proved that binary sorted 
code can be used as an alternative for handling collusion attack. Veerubhotla et al. 
[55] demonstrated how Reed Solomon code can be used to provide certain form of 
traceability by showing that given a word that is a linear combination of some 
codewords, we can determine the unique set of codewords used to construct the word 
efficiently. However, they also pointed out that if colluding members create an illicit 
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 copy by making erasure in every detectable mark, it may be impossible to trace the 
colluders. Consequently, for tracing to be successful with high probability, the 
strategy chosen by colluders must be controlled, which is almost impossible to do in 
real life. 
 
3.3.5 Other Related Works 
Senoh et al. [47] addressed the inconvenience caused by many different DRM system 
employed by many different providers. User must install many different players to 
support many different file formats because those protection systems have no 
capability to inter-operate with each other. They proposed a new Intellectual Property 
Management and Protection (IPMP) method which supports inter-operability between 
those protection systems, while maintaining each of them individually. This method 
was proposed at ISO/IEC JTC1/SC29/WG11 (MPEG) in 2000 and the specification 
has been standardized as ISO/IEC 14496-1 Amendment 3 (MPEG-4 IPMP 
Extension), ISO/IEC 14496-13 (MPEG-4 IPMP), and ISO/IEC 13818-11 (MPEG-2 
IPMP). This method requires content provider to send the protected content together 
with the IPMP information which tells users how the content is protected, what tools 
are needed to decode the protected content, and how to configure these tools to access 
and decode the content. If any of these tools are unavailable, IPMP information tells 
users the URLs where they can be downloaded or the necessary decoders can be 
delivered together with the content itself. This approach solves the inter-operability 
problem and makes it easier to renew a protection system. However, by telling users 
how the content is protected and how to decode it, it also tells pirates how to attack 
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 the protection system more effectively. It also adds some overhead for the terminal to 
read and digest this IPMP information before it can access the content. 
Embedding user-specific watermarks to the contents and appending user 
identities to the digital licenses, to certain extent, have affected user privacy. Conrado 
et al. [13] and Feigenbaum et al. [18] pointed out this privacy issue and explained 
how users can be annoyed by the rights purchase and content usage tracking done by 
the content provider. They suggested that rights issuing must be done anonymously. 
Conrado et al. proposed the use of secret security identifier (SSI), instead of user’s 
public key, in license issuing process to conceal the real user identity. This SSI can be 
changed regularly to make tracking difficult. However, it results in a need to keep 
track all the SSI changes for all users, and therefore makes forensic tracking more 
difficult as well. Feigenbaum et al. suggested that in the process of content usage 
tracking, the content providers should collect only information that they really need 
and they should disclose how this information would be used. User privacy might 
seem to be irrelevant in the context of digital cinema, but we should not overlook the 
possibility of tracking done by pirates to obtain information about all contents a 
theater has access to and to create over time a pattern of theater’s content usage.  
Skraparlis [50] explained the use of message authentication codes (MAC) and 
digital signatures to protect the integrity of digital content. He explained a few ways 
to apply the hash function on the data blocks. Besides that, he also mentioned that 
labeling is more preferable than watermarking to be used as the medium of the 
authentication codes. Watermarking techniques are not chosen because its efficacy is 
unproven, it has relatively higher complexity, and it causes quality degradation. At the 
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 same time, MAC does not have to be hidden imperceptibly as it is already protected 
by a cryptographic hash function.  
 
Summary 
The summary of all related works presented in this section is shown on the table 
below. 
Table 1. Comparison among some existing protection systems used for digital video. 
 Related Works CP AC UR FT QS E S R UP CS 
Liu et al. [34] 3 3 3 3 3      
Bloom [1] 3 3 3 3       
Kirovski et al. [26] 3 3 3 3  3  3   
Lin et al. [30] 3 3 3 3 3 3     
Lin et al. [31] 3 3 3 3 3 3  3   
Linnartz et al. [33] 3 3 3 3 3      
Grimm & Aichroth [24] 3 3 3 3 3 3     
Byers et al. [3] 3 3 3 3       








Chu et al. [11] 3 3 3 3 3 3 3    
Tosun & Feng [52] 3 3         
Tosun & Feng [53] 3 3    3     
Liu & Li [35] 3 3         
Lookabaugh & Sicker [36] 3 3    3     
Chiaraluce et al. [7] 3 3         






Zeng & Lei [57] 3 3         
Dittman et al. [16]  3 3 3 3      
Wessely et al. [56]  3 3 3       
Cheng & Huang [5]  3 3 3 3 3     









Lu et al. [37]  3 3 3       
Kundur & Karthik [27]    3  3     
Schonberg & Kirovski [46]    3 3      
Boneh & Shaw [2]    3       
Trappe et al. [54]    3       
Ferrer & Joancomarti  [19]    3       







Veerubhotla et al. [55]    3       
Senoh et al. [47]       3    
Conrado et al. [13]  3       3  
Feigenbaum et al. [18]   3      3  Mi
sc
. 
Skraparlis [50]   3        
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 Note:  CP  - Concealment and Content Protection 
AC  - Access Control 
UR  - Content Usage Rights Management 
FT  - Forensic Tracking 
QS - Quality of Service 
E - Efficiency 
S  - Scalability 
R  - Renewability 
UP - User Privacy 
CS - Customer’s Security 
 
Observe that despite all different protection mechanisms they provide, all of 
them protect only the rights of content provider and none of them addresses the rights 
of the customers. We shall see in the next section how a failure in protecting 
customer’s rights causes these protection schemes to be totally unfair to customers. In 
section 5, we shall present three solutions to this problem. 
 
4. BUYER-SELLER WATERMARKING PROTOCOL 
Encryption and access control scheme of a Digital Rights Management (DRM) 
system only protect the content from being illegally accessed by unauthorized users. 
They do not prevent an authorized user from illicitly reproducing the content. 
Moreover, no matter how robust and reliable the cryptosystem and the access control 
scheme are, all these mechanisms will be ineffectual when the movie is converted into 
analog signal and displayed on a movie screen. Regardless of all different kinds of 
protection systems being used, a digital movie eventually needs to be presented to the 
viewers in the clear, causing it to be unprotected and vulnerable to illegal copying. 
This problem, known as “the analog hole” problem, has been responsible for most of 
illicit copies available at large. 
In order to fight against illegal copying, both copy protection and copy 
deterrence systems can be used as complimentary protection systems. Although copy 
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 protection system, like a special hardware used for viewing and copying or an 
invisible watermark inserted to indicate number of copies allowed to be made, 
successfully prevents users from digitally copying the content files, it does not solve 
the analog hole problem and it is unable to help in identifying the copyright violator. 
Copy deterrence system, on the other hand, is achieved by a mechanism that chains 
the identity of each user to the copy of content he owns. A user-specific distinct 
watermark, called digital fingerprint, is embedded into each copy of the films that 
content provider distributes. This mechanism discourages users from performing 
unauthorized duplication and distribution. Simultaneously, it provides a forensic-
tracking mean for content provider. Whenever an illicit copy is found, the origin of 
the copy can be determined by extracting the unique watermark embedded in the 
copy. Knowing that any protection systems can never guarantee a perfect security at 
all times, it is very important to include this tracking mechanism in the system.  
Nevertheless, digital fingerprinting only supplies right protection to content 
provider and does not protect the rights of customers at all. The consequences of this 
unfairness are elaborated in the following subsection, followed by the buyer-seller 
watermarking concept to solve the problem and overview to works having been done 
in the two subsequent subsections.  
 
4.1 Customer’s Right Problem 
A digital fingerprinting scheme is, in the first place, designed to protect the copyright 
of a content provider, and not to protect that of the customers. In all fingerprinting 
schemes, it is always assumed implicitly that the content provider is honest and 
trustworthy [44], whereas customers are always deemed as highly potential source of 
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 piracy acts. As the result, every scheme gives the content provider a full control over 
the fingerprinting process. Fingerprint generation, insertion, and detection are solely 
done by content provider; no other party is involved in any of those processes.  
Unfortunately, the assumption on seller’s reliability and honesty may not 
always hold in real life, causing all fingerprinting schemes to be biased and unfair to 
customers. The following situations show what harm this assumption can do to a 
lawful customer:  
• False implication 
Suppose after sending a fingerprinted copy of a digital content to user U, the 
content provider unintentionally inserts the fingerprint generated specifically for 
user U into the copy sent to another user, let’s say user V. Assume that V is 
malicious user and illegally reproduces and redistributes the content. Later, when 
content provider finds an illicit copy distributed by V, instead of admitting his 
mistake that he used the same fingerprint for two different users, he can choose to 
accuse user U of a piracy act since the fingerprint found in the illegal copy 
matches the one in the copy user U has. User U has no way to prove his innocence 
as the evidence does not side him and he does not know about the mistake done by 
content provider.   
• Framing by content distributor 
Assume that content provider hires an agent A to distribute the digital content he 
produces and agent A will pay the royalty fee on per-copy basis. Legally, agent A 
must sell different copies to different users. Nonetheless, in order to maximize his 
profit, agent A can choose to sell the same copy to many different buyers, let’s say 
user U is one of the buyers. Later, agent A will report to content provider that he 
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 only sold one copy to user U. It does not really matter whether the other buyers 
illegally distribute their copies or not. Once content provider discovers the 
existence of their copies, user U will be implicated and sued for illegal 
redistribution, even though he did not do it. Again, he cannot deny the accusation 
since the evidence spells his name as the culprit and he has no idea about the 
unlawful act of agent A. 
• Framing by content provider 
Because the fingerprint generation process is completely controlled by content 
provider, he knows the exact fingerprint inserted to the copy that each customer 
receives. Therefore, he has no difficulty in reproducing the exact fingerprinted 
copy that a particular user receives. Assume that content provider is malicious and 
he has sold a copy of certain digital content to user U. In order to get a good 
amount of money in a very easy way, content provider can reproduce copies of the 
same content containing fingerprint of user U and distribute them. Consequently, 
he can charge user U for illegal distribution and ask for compensation from him. 
The same as the two previous cases, user U has no way to refute the accusation for 
his unique fingerprint is found in an illegal copy. 
 
 It is very clear from the three cases that due to the assumption on seller’s 
honesty, the rights and interests of customers are left unprotected, which potentially 
causes a legitimate customer to bear the punishment of a deed that he did not do. This 
condition where customer’s rights are unprotected and vulnerable to framing attack 
defines the customer’s right problem.  
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  Beside false implication and framing, the worst consequence of customer’s 
right problem is that it nullifies the objective and the purpose of fingerprinting itself. 
Once customers learn about this specific problem, it can cause an irresolvable dispute. 
Imagine a situation where content provider performs every transaction legally, but 
there is a malicious customer who redistributes the digital content he has. Content 
provider can actually bring the matter to the court and sue this particular user for an 
act of piracy. However, now this malicious user can deny his unlawful act and point 
his finger at content provider by claiming that the illicit copy was produced by the 
content provider. He can argue that content provider knows the exact fingerprint 
inserted into his copy, and therefore content provider can reproduce the copy he owns 
effortlessly. When it happens, content provider will have no proof to establish the 
truth and the guilty user is able to escape from the consequence of his act. In other 
word, the forensic tracking mechanism is made void. 
 
4.2 Description and Requirements 
Customer’s right problem in the traditional fingerprinting schemes was first brought 
up to the surface by Qiao and Nahrstedt [44] in 1998. However, their protocols did 
not effectively solve the problem. It was the protocol proposed by Memon and Wong 
[39] later in the same year that first successfully solved the customer’s right problem. 
From that moment on, every protocol designed to address customer’s right problem is 
named after the name of Memon and Wong’s protocol, Buyer-Seller Watermarking 
Protocol. The overview of those two works are presented in the next subsection, 
whereas the details can be found in [44] and [39][40]. 
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  A Buyer-Seller Watermarking Protocol is a protocol that incorporates 
techniques of watermarking and fingerprinting to protect the rights of both the buyer 
(customer) and the seller (content provider) [23]. 
 The underlying idea of a buyer-seller watermarking protocol is to insert into 
the digital content to be distributed another special mark, besides the normal digital 
fingerprint, that both content provider and customer have no full knowledge of. 
Instead of letting content provider completely control the generation of this mark, 
both content provider and customer take part in the process and each contributes a 
part of the mark produced. However, content provider knows nothing about the part 
created by customer, and vice versa. Therefore, none of them knows the exact mark 
being inserted into the content. 
 Content provider not knowing the exact watermarked copy that a customer 
receives implies that he cannot reproduce copies of the original content containing the 
customer’s watermark, and thus he cannot falsely accuse an innocent customer of a 
piracy act. On the other hand, content provider is still able to identify the source of an 
unlawful act from the fingerprint and watermark found in unauthorized copy, and then 
prove it to a third party without having to worry about customer claiming that the 
illicit copy may be originated from him. At the same time, the fact that customer does 
not know the exact watermark inserted guarantees that he cannot remove it from the 
content he receives. It is clear that in a buyer-seller watermarking protocol, neither 
content provider nor customer is assumed to be honest and trustworthy.  
 Besides providing a robust forensic tracking mean and preventing framing, 
there are some other requirements that a buyer-seller watermarking protocol should 
satisfy. These requirements often measure the performance of a protocol, so satisfying 
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 all of them will be the ideal situation. However, satisfying one requirement often 
means refutation of some other requirements, making it difficult to provide them all. 
The requirements of a buyer-seller watermarking protocol are listed below. The list of 
requirements is compiled from [8][9][23][25][29]. 
• Traceability 
A watermarking protocol should enable content provider to trace a piracy act to its 
source. In other words, content provider should be able to identify customers who 
duplicate and redistribute their contents illegitimately. 
• No Repudiation 
A watermarking protocol should prevent guilty customers from denying their 
unlawful act. A buyer accused of illegal copying should not be able to claim that 
the unauthorized copy may be produced by content provider or a security breach 
of his system. This requirement provides content provider’s security. 
• No Framing 
A watermarking protocol should eliminate the possibility of accusing an innocent 
customer. Neither malicious content provider nor other customers should be able 
to run away from the consequence of their violations by pushing the blame to an 
honest customer. Customer’s security is assured by this requirement. 
• Collusion Resistance 
A watermarking protocol should not enable a coalition of customers to locate, 
delete, or fabricate the special mark embedded by comparing their copies. Even 
though they have access to certain number of watermarked copies, they should not 
be able to find the mark and recover the original content. 
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 • Anonymity 
A watermarking protocol should allow customers to purchase a digital content 
without having to expose their identity to the content provider.  
• Unlinkability 
A watermark protocol should prevent content provider from recording the 
purchase history of a customer. Given two different watermarked contents, it 
should be infeasible to deduce if they are purchased by the same customer. 
• No Additional Trusted Third Party  
Besides an arbiter and certification authority (CA), a watermark protocol should 
not require the involvement of a trusted third party (TTP) in any stage of the 
process. Buyer-seller watermarking protocol was first introduced to eliminate the 
assumption on seller’s honesty, therefore it is unreasonable to introduce another 
participating party, other than arbiter and CA, whose honesty is assumed. The 
assumption on arbiter’s and CA’s honesty is acceptable since it also exists in the 
original situation, i.e. in the traditional fingerprinting and watermarking schemes. 
Hence, having this assumption does not make a buyer-seller watermarking 
protocol inferior to traditional fingerprinting and watermarking schemes. 
• No Unbinding Problem 
A watermark protocol should provide a mechanism to bind a generated watermark 
to the specific digital content it is inserted, and thus prevent content provider from 
transplanting a watermark detected in a pirated copy into other copies of (possibly 
higher-priced) digital contents in order to get more compensation. This unbinding 
problem was first discovered by Lei et al. [29]. 
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 • Customer’s Convenience 
A watermark protocol should not hinder customers from purchasing a digital 
content by the inconvenience it causes. It is important to minimize the amount of 
computation required to purchase a digital content. Customers should not be 
burdened by a heavy computation. Neither should they be required to 
communicate with many parties in a single transaction. In some cases, it is also 
good to exempt customers from participating in dispute resolution process. 
Moreover, due to the number of contents a buyer could purchase, a watermark 
protocol should enable customers to decrypt many different contents using a 
single key. Thus, customers do not have to maintain a list of keys needed to 
decrypt all contents they purchased. 
 
4.3 Existing Solutions 
In order to address the customer’s right problem, Qiao and Nahrstedt [44] proposed 
two watermarking protocols which are based on non-invertible watermarking scheme. 
The first protocol, called TTP watermarking protocol, depends heavily on a trusted 
third party to perform watermark generation and embedding. Content provider and 
customer do not directly communicate to each other. Every transaction is done with 
TTP as their middleman. Content provider sends the original content to TTP for 
watermarking. TTP encrypts the original content using DES and uses the ciphertext as 
the watermark. This ciphertext is embedded into the content and the watermarked 
content is sent to the customer. Realizing the heavy burden a TTP has, Qiao and 
Nahrstedt proposed the second protocol, called Owner-Customer watermarking 
protocol. In this method, customer generates a random sequence by encrypting a bit 
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 sequence mutually agreed between customer and owner, and then sends it to the 
owner. Content provider encrypts this sequence using DES and embeds the ciphertext 
into the content as a watermark and sends the watermarked content to the customer 
encrypted using the random bits he generated earlier. As only customers know the key 
used to generate the random bits, all legal customers now have evidence to prove their 
rights on the content. However, these two methods do not solve the customer’s right 
problem since the content provider knows exactly each watermark embedded to the 
customer’s copy, and therefore he can reproduce the same watermarked copy and 
redistribute it. As the result, content provider can frame innocent users by accusing 
them of a piracy act. 
The Buyer-Seller watermarking protocol proposed by Memon and Wong 
[39][40] is the first method that solved the customer’s right problem. They 
successfully designed a protocol that prevents both content provider and customer 
from knowing the exact watermark being embedded to the content. Their protocol 
requires a trusted third party, called Watermark Certification Authority (WCA), to 
generate the watermarks on customer’s behalf. In their protocol, transaction starts 
with a request for a watermark from buyer to WCA. Memoryless WCA generates a 
random watermark, encrypts it using customer’s public key, and transmits it to 
customer. Customer will then send this encrypted watermark to content provider. 
Content provider first produces a fingerprint, unique to each customer, and inserts it 
into the content in order to enable him to identify each copy sold. He will then 
generate a random permutation function to permute the encrypted watermark received 
from customer. This encrypted and permuted watermark will be inserted to the 
encrypted content as a second watermark. This can be done due to the use of public 
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 key cryptosystem that is privacy homomorphic with respect to watermark insertion 
operation. The encrypted watermarked content will be then transmitted to the 
requesting buyer. By inserting the watermark in encrypted form, seller does not know 
the exact watermarked copy that buyer receives, thus he cannot create copies of the 
original content containing the buyer’s watermark. On the other side, content provider 
still can identify the buyer of an unauthorized copy from the fingerprint found in it. 
The most undesirable feature of this protocol is the requirement of a trusted and 
reliable WCA. WCA is required in order to ensure that the watermark used in each 
transaction is not approximately invariant to permutation. However, without an 
assumption on its honesty, it is possible that WCA colludes with either seller or buyer 
to frame the other party. 
 Due to the success Memon and Wong achieved in solving customer’s right 
problem, their protocol became the foundation of many other protocols proposed after 
theirs. Some variants of Memon and Wong’s protocol can be found in 
[6][9][17][23][25].  
Cheung and Curreem [6] modified Memon and Wong’s protocol by 
introducing the concept of watermark certificate and accommodating ownership 
transfer of sold contents. A watermark certificate produced by WCA consists of 
encrypted watermark, the encryption key, and digital signature of them signed by 
WCA. They claimed that it is used in order to prevent the encrypted watermark of a 
user to be used by another user, who had sold a digital content to the user, in some 
other transaction with content provider. In Cheung and Currem’s protocol, when a 
customer wants to buy a digital content from other customer, the buying customer 
sends his watermark certificate to the selling customer. The selling customer will then 
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 forward his watermarked content and the watermark certificate to the content 
provider. Content provider will produce a new watermarked content carrying buying 
customer’s watermark and send it to the selling customer, followed by selling 
customer forwarding it to the buying customer. Even though it is claimed to be useful, 
the concept of watermark certificate is actually redundant. In Memon and Wong’s 
protocol itself, the encrypted watermark of a user cannot be used by another user 
because only that particular user knows the corresponding secret key, another user 
will not be able to decrypt the encrypted content without this secret key. Additionally, 
the transfer of ownership is not a desirable feature for content provider. Therefore, 
assuming the willingness of content provider to be involved in the process is not 
realistic. 
Ju et al. [25] introduced the use of a pair of one-time anonymous public and 
private keys in order to provide buyer’s anonymity and transaction unlinkability. The 
identity of a customer will only be revealed by WCA when he is involved in an illegal 
redistribution. Moreover, they do not require customers to be involved in the dispute 
resolution process. Instead, customers need to send their private key encrypted using a 
judge’s public key to WCA, so that the judge can access it whenever dispute 
resolution is considered necessary. However, it means that the judge that will be act as 
an arbiter must be decided before any transaction and take part in the watermark 
generation protocol. No other judge will later be able to help to resolve the dispute. It 
also implies that the honesty of judge is assumed and the possibility of WCA 
colluding with the judge to betray either seller or buyer is ignored. Beside that, 
trusting WCA to keep customer’s identity and their private keys is not a very good 
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 idea. It is a single point failure that once it is compromised, the security system will 
be torn down.  
Choi et al. [9] addressed the issue of possible collusion among content 
provider, WCA, and judge in Ju et al.’s protocol. They modified Memon and Wong’s 
protocol by changing its watermark generation protocol with theirs. In their method, 
WCA must generate a number of watermarks for a customer to choose. The concept 
of commutative cryptosystem is applied in order to conceal the watermark chosen by 
customer from WCA. They also use anonymous pair of public and private keys to 
provide user’s anonymity and unlinkability. Choi et al. undo the changes made by Ju 
et al. in dispute resolution protocol and restore it to that of Memon and Wong’s 
protocol, so that arbiter can be appointed only when it is necessary and no judge is 
involved in watermark generation protocol. Even though they successfully eliminate 
the possibility of collusion between judge and the other parties, but honesty of WCA 
is still assumed. WCA knows the true identity of customers and by colluding with 
seller the chosen watermark can be recovered. It is done by comparing the encrypted 
form of every watermark offered to customer to the one that seller keeps for that 
particular customer. So, other than anonymity and unlinkability, this protocol has the 
same properties as those of Memon and Wong’s. 
Goi et al. [23] provided the security analysis for Ju et al.’s and Choi et al’s 
protocols, followed by presenting their remedy to those problems in their work. They 
eliminate the possible involvement of WCA in a collusion by letting the customer to 
generate his own watermark. However, they forgot that it may threaten seller’s 
security as customer may produce watermark which is invariant to permutation. 
Therefore, it defeats the main purpose why the concept of WCA is introduced in the 
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 first place. Goi et al. also suggested that customers certify their anonymous key pairs 
to certificate authority (CA), which is definitely trustable, instead of WCA.    
Emmanuel and Kankanhalli [17] explained the use of Memon and Wong’s 
buyer-seller protocol in the context of video broadcast. First, broadcaster will produce 
a masked video by blending an opaque mask frame onto the original video. The same 
masked video will be sent to all subscribers. The buyer-seller protocol will be then 
applied to obtain subscriber’s watermark, so that the unmasking frame can be tailored 
uniquely for each subscriber. The unmasking frame received by each subscriber is 
actually the masking frame subtracted by the broadcaster-generated fingerprint and 
the subscriber’s watermark. Thus, when unmasking process is done, the content will 
be automatically fingerprinted and watermarked. Again, the major weakness of this 
method is the requirement of trusted WCA. Besides that, they suggested to use 
Niederreiter public-key cryptosystem that is privacy homomorphic with respect to 
addition in order to enable unmasking-frame production without broadcaster knowing 
the exact watermark being embedded. This cryptosystem adds too much redundancy 
to the ciphertext and causes a severe blow up in the size of the ciphertext. They 
mentioned that for plaintext of size 32 bits, it will result in a ciphertext of length 370 
bits, which means more than ten times of the length of the plaintext. In their protocol, 
the unmasking frame, which is as big as the video to broadcast, must be sent in 
encrypted form. As the result, the bandwidth required for sending the unmasking 
frame is simply too large.  
Chang and Chung [4] claimed that Memon and Wong’s protocol cannot 
withstand man-in-the-middle attack because content provider never provides his 
private information to convince customer that he is the genuine content provider. 
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 Hence, they proposed a protocol where content provider uses a pair of private and 
public keys similar to those in El Gamal cryptosystem to control the generation and 
verification of the embedded watermark. In their protocol, customer generates his 
own watermark and then permutes it using a one-way permutation function before 
sending it to the provider. This permuted watermark will be combined with 
fingerprint generated specifically for the customer using content provider’s private 
key to produce a new watermark. The resulting watermark will be then inserted to the 
content and the watermarked content will be transmitted to the customer. However, 
their effort and idea are not very useful because their claim about the Memon and 
Wong’s protocol is not true in the first place. Memon and Wong assumed secure 
authentication before the protocol starts, and thus the two parties can identify 
themselves to each other. In addition, the permutation function used in the watermark 
embedding process is only known by the content provider. So, it is clear that we do 
not need another kind of private key to control the watermark generation. The worst 
thing about Chang and Chung’s protocol is the fact that their modification makes void 
the protection against false implication as content provider has now full knowledge 
about the exact watermark inserted, and therefore defeats the main objective of the 
interactive protocol. 
Another variant of Memon and Wong’s work is Lei et al.’s work [29] that 
spotted unbinding problem in all protocols proposed earlier, including Memon and 
Wong’s. Unbinding problem is caused by failure to provide proper mechanism to bind 
a generated watermark to the specific digital content it is inserted. This problem 
enables content provider to transplant a watermark detected in a pirated copy into 
other copies of (possibly higher-priced) digital contents and get more compensation. 
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 They tackle this problem by requiring seller and buyer to set up a common agreement 
specific for a particular content that will be involved in the transaction. Once agreed, 
it is now content provider, not customer, who will request for a watermark to WCA. 
WCA will send back the generated watermark encrypted using customer public key to 
keep seller in the dark about the inserted watermark. WCA is also asked to produce 
the signature of the watermark and the agreement in order to explicitly bind these two 
data. As buyer has no knowledge about the watermark, seller does not need to 
permute it and he can directly embed it together with a fingerprint into the content in 
encrypted domain. Consequently, the watermarking employed need not be linear. 
Buyer will receive the watermarked content in encrypted form. In this protocol, 
customer only needs to communicate with seller and nobody else during the 
transaction. Moreover, he is not involved in dispute resolution protocol as judge asks 
WCA, instead of buyer, to reveal the watermark. Nonetheless, the assumption on the 
honesty of WCA is still a must to prevent a conspiracy between WCA and seller. 
Moreover, in this protocol, content provider can cheat by sending a random key, 
instead of customer’s public key, to WCA. WCA will use the key to encrypt the 
watermark. By using the corresponding decryption key, content provider will have no 
problem in recovering the watermark generated. In other word, customer’s right 
problem is unsolved. 
Choi and Park [8] showed how the idea of buyer-seller protocol can be applied 
in multiple-purchase environment and how it can be adjusted to accommodate mobile 
communications with limited computing resources. They used a concept similar to El 
Gamal cryptosystem to achieve a protocol which needs only one decryption key for 
deciphering multiple contents encrypted using many different keys. However, their 
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 protocol requires customer to do all purchases at one time, making it a bit unrealistic. 
The assumption on the honesty and reliability of WCA is still needed as well. To 
enable buyer-seller protocol on mobile communications, Choi and Park introduced the 
use of mobile agent, which will perform most of the computation steps on behalf of 
customers. They shift the work from customers to this mobile agent. Unfortunately, as 




Please refer to the following table for the comparison among all existing solutions 
discussed in this section. 
Table 2. Comparison among all existing buyer-seller watermarking protocols. 
Existing Solutions 
Requirements 
[44] [40] [6] [25] [9] [23] [17] [4] [29] [8] 
Traceability Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No Repudiation No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes 
No Framing No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Collusion Resistance No No No No Yes No Yes No No Yes 
Anonymity No No No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Unlinkability No No No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
No Additional TTP (WCA) Yes No No No No Yes No Yes No No 
No Unbounding Problem No No No No No No No No Yes No 
Customer’s Convenience           
• Not watermark generator Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes 
• Number of parties to 
communicate with 
1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 
• No participation in 
dispute resolution 
No No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes 
• Single decryption key in 
multiple purchases No No No No No No No No No Yes 
Note:  [44] refers to Qiao and Nahrstedt’s Owner-Customer Watermarking Protocol, which 
is better than their TTP Watermarking Protocol. 
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 It is shown on the above table that all existing solutions truly depend on an 
additional trusted third party to solve the customer’s right problem. The existing 
protocols that do not require the participation of a WCA fail to solve the problem, 
which is indicated in their failure to satisfy either no repudiation or no framing 
requirements. In the next section, we shall see how customer’s right problem can be 
successfully solved without having to involve any additional trusted third party. 
 
5. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
All existing solutions to customer’s right problem rely on the trustworthiness of 
Watermark Certification Authority (WCA) as a party who generates a valid 
watermark for every transaction. WCA is required in those solutions to ensure that the 
watermark used in each transaction is not approximately invariant to permutation. 
Otherwise, it will be possible for customer to perform a brute-force attack in order to 
figure out the permuted watermark, and thus remove it from the copy he received 
from content provider. Although those protocols assume that WCA is memoryless, it 
is almost impossible for us to assume that WCA does not have the full knowledge of 
the watermark used in each transaction. As the result, there is a possibility that WCA 
colludes with either content provider or customer to betray the other party. In order to 
avoid this situation, they assume that WCA is honest. 
 However, as we have seen earlier, introducing a new trusted third party is not 
the best option because buyer-seller watermarking protocol was, in the first place, 
invented to eliminate an assumption on seller’s honesty. 
 In order to address this issue, we propose three buyer-seller watermarking 
protocols that do not require the participation of other trusted third party besides the 
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 arbiter and certification authority (CA). We shall see in this section how we can 
actually remove the requirement of a watermark certification authority without 
ignoring the reasons it was introduced. On the other hand, it is totally acceptable to 
assume that arbiter and CA are honest since this assumption does exist in the 
traditional fingerprinting and watermarking schemes. Moreover, CA is the issuer of 
public key certificates in public-key cryptosystem infrastructure, so it is definitely 
trustable. Otherwise, no public-key cryptosystem would be secure and no public and 
private key pair would be binding or confidential [23]. 
 Before we start elaborating our protocols, let us first introduce the notations 
that will be used in the explanation of those protocols.  
 
5.1 Notations and Assumptions 
In the model of the proposed protocols, four different roles involved are as follows: 
1. S : the seller, content provider who wishes to make a profit on the sales of 
digital contents he produces. 
2. B : the buyer, customer who purchases copies of the digital contents from S. 
3. CA : a trusted certification authority who is responsible for issuing  public-key 
certificates to all parties involved in the protocols. 
4. J : the judge, an arbiter who adjudicates lawsuits against the infringement of 
copyright and intellectual property. 
The notations are defined as follows: 
X  The original unwatermarked copy of a digital content. 
V  A digital fingerprint generated by seller specifically for each buyer.  
W  The watermark to be inserted to the content. 
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 X ′  The fingerprinted copy of the content. 
X ′′  The fingerprinted and watermarked copy of the content, which is 
delivered to the buyer. 
⊕  The watermark insertion operation. 
( ,I I )pk sk  A public-private key pair of individual I. The public key is denoted 
by Ipk , whereas  denotes the private key. Isk
( )
Ipk
E M  The ciphertext of message M encrypted using I’s public key. 
( )
Isk
D C  The plaintext of ciphertext C decrypted using I’s private key. 
( )
Isk
Sign M  The signature of message M signed by I using his private key. 








D C  The plaintext of ciphertext C decrypted using a homomorphic 
public-key cryptosystem. 
In our protocols, we assume that public-key infrastructure has been established 
and each party involved has already had his own public-private key pair as well as a 
digital certificate issued by CA. Therefore, before each transaction, all parties 
involved are able to authenticate each other and communication between any two 
parties can be done in a secure manner. 
We also assume the existence of a public key cryptosystem that is privacy 
homomorphic with respect to the watermark insertion operation ⊕ . A cryptosystem is 
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 a privacy homomorphism with respect to operation ⊕  if and only if it has the property 
that 
E⊕( ) ( ) ( )1 2 1 2k kE m m E m m⊕ =  k
for any m  and  in the message space and for any k in the key space [40]. So, by 
interchanging the encryption and insertion operation, the result will still be the same. 
This property enables us to insert a watermark in the encrypted domain. Please refer 
to Section 6.1 for some instances of such cryptosystem. 
1 2m
 Another assumption we make is that every message exchanged between any 
two parties includes a timestamp and nonce, like in Emmanuel and Kankanhalli’s 
protocol [17]. A timestamp indicates the generation and expiration time of the 
message, whereas nonce is a random number that has to be unique within the time 
span indicated by the timestamp. Nonce is used in order to prevent replay attack. 
However, they will not be written explicitly for the sake of clarity. 
 
5.2 Memon and Wong’s Buyer-Seller Watermarking Protocol 
without Watermark Certification Authority 
The first protocol that we propose is a variant of Memon and Wong’s buyer-seller 
watermarking protocol [39][40]. We modify Memon and Wong’s protocol by 
removing the Watermark Certification Authority (WCA) role and shifting the task of 
generating watermark to the buyer. Hence, a customer must generate his own 
watermark for each purchase he makes. In order to prevent customers from generating 
a watermark which is invariant to permutation, content provider needs to check the 
validity of the watermark sent by customer and he can reject it if it is invalid.  
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  This protocol consists of three subprotocols, they are content-watermarking 
protocol, copyright violator identification protocol, and dispute resolution protocol. 
The detail of each subprotocol is presented below. 
 
5.2.1  Content-Watermarking Protocol 
Let B be the customer wanting to purchase a copy of content X from S. 
1. Buyer B generates a watermark ( )1 2, , , nw w= …W w  specifically for this 
transaction. 
2. Buyer B chooses a public-private key pair ( ),H Hpk sk  for the homomorphic 
cryptosystem, and then computes ( )HBskgn pkSi . 
3. Buyer B encrypts W with Hpk  to obtain  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 2, , ,H H H Hpk pk pk pk nE W E w E w E w= … , 
and then signs it using his private key  to get Bsk ( )( )B Hsk pkSign E W . 
4.  Buyer B sends Hpk , ( )Bsk Hgn pkSi , ( )HpkE W , and ( )( )B Hsk pkSign E W  to S. 
5. Seller S verifies the signature of encrypted watermark Sign  by 
checking if 
( )( )B Hsk pkE W
( )( )( )B B Hpk sk pkign E WE S  is equal to ( )WHpkE . If they are equal, S 
continues with the next step, otherwise the transaction is cancelled. In the same 
way, S also verifies the encryption key Hpk  and its signature Sign .  ( )Bsk Hpk
6. Let b b  be all the different blocks in a string U , , { }1 2, , , 0,1 kpb ∈… { }0,1 qk∈ 0k >
0 p q< ≤ , and each bi occurs ci times, 1 ic q≤ ≤ , in U. Define a function perm 
as follows: 
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Seller S computes ( )( )Hpkperm E W
)W
 to get the number of different permutations 
to which  is not invariant, i.e. the number of permutations (
Hpk
E σ  such that 
. Observe that ( )( )H pkE W ≠ ( )HE Wpkσ ( )( )Hpkperm E W  also indicates the 
number of permutations to which W is not invariant. It is because every 
encryption function is injective, i.e. for all messages x and y, 
( ) ( )
H Hpkpk
x y E x E y== ⇔ . 
7. Seller S checks the validity of watermark W by comparing the number of 
different permutations to which ( )
Hpk
WE  is not invariant, to a threshold permδ . 
This threshold is used by S to ensure that the watermark W presented by B is not 
approximately invariant to permutation, i.e. the number of permutations σ  such 
that  is large enough, so that it is infeasible for B to perform a brute 
force attack to guess the permutation that will be used by S in step 9. If 
, then S continues with the next step. Otherwise, S 
rejects watermark W. 
( )W Wσ ≠
( )( HpkE W ) permperm δ≥
8.  Seller S generates a fingerprint V, which is unique for each customer, and then 
inserts it into the original copy of the digital content X to get a fingerprinted 
copy X X V′ = ⊕ . 
9.  Seller S chooses a random permutation σ , and uses it to permute the elements 
of the encrypted watermark ( )
Hpk
E W . In other words, S computes 
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      ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 2, , ,H H H Hpk pk pk pk nE W E w E w E w= …σ σ  
     ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )1 2, , ,H H Hpk pk pk nE w E w E wσ σ … σ=  
     ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 2, , ,Hpk nE w w wσ σ σ…=  
     ( )( )1 2, , ,Hpk nE w w wσ …=  
     ( )( )
Hpk
E Wσ= . 
This equation ( )( ) ( )( )H Hpk pkE W E Wσ σ=
( )
 is true as E  is of the form (
Hpk
W )
( ) ( )( 1 2, , ,H H Hpk n )pk pkE w E w E w… , and thus interchanging encryption and 
permutation operations will give us the same result.  
10. Seller S inserts the permuted watermark into the fingerprinted content X ′  in 
encrypted domain. In other words, S first computes ( )
Hpk
X ′E , and then inserts 
the permuted encrypted watermark to it, to obtain the encrypted and 
watermarked content X ′′ . 
( ) ( ) ( )( )
H H Hpk pk pk
E X E X E Wσ′′ ′= ⊕  
      ( )( )
Hpk
E X Wσ′⊕= . 
11. Seller S sends (
Hpk
E X )′′  to buyer B. 
12. Seller S stores identity of buyer B, BID , Hpk , , ( )Bsk HSign pk ( )HpkE W , 
, V, and ( )(B Hsk pkSign E W ) σ  as one entry in TableX. TableX contains one entry 
for each copy of X that S sells. 
13. Buyer B decrypts the encrypted content he receives from seller S using the 
corresponding decryption key Hsk  to obtain the watermarked content X ′′ . That 
is B computes 
( )( ) ( )H Hsk pkD E X X X V Wσ′′ ′′= = ⊕ ⊕ . 
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 Please refer to figure 4 for the idea underlying this content-watermarking protocol. 
 
Figure 4. Content-watermarking protocol of the first protocol. 
 
5.2.2  Copyright Violator Identification Protocol 
1.  When seller S discovers an authorized copy of content X, say Y, he extracts the 
unique fingerprint embedded in Y using the watermark extraction function D, 
which takes both X and Y as its input. Let ( ),FOUND D X=V  be the fingerprint 
detected in Y. 
Y
2.  Seller S correlates V  with every fingerprint stored in TableX in order to find 




V  be 
the fingerprint that has the highest correlation with V . If fingerprint V  
cannot be matched to any fingerprint in TableX, then the protocol fails. 
FOUND D
3.  Seller S retrieves all the information that corresponds to fingerprint MAXV  from 
TableX. The information includes the identity of buyer, say BID , his encrypted 
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 watermark and its signature, ( )
Hpk
WE  and ( )( )B Hsk pkSign E W  respectively, the 
encryption key of the homomorphic cryptosystem and its signature, Hpk and 
 respectively, and permutation (
Bsk H
Sign pk ) σ . 
( )E W ( ))B HpkE WSign Hpk )H
σ
( )( )W
( ))( )H W ( )HpkE W
Hpk BskSign




Once seller S has the identity of buyer from whom the unauthorized copy was 
originated, S can appoint a judge J and proceed with dispute resolution protocol. 
 
5.2.3 Dispute Resolution Protocol 
Let J be the judge appointed by S to resolve the dispute between him and buyer B. 
1. Seller S sends Y, BID , Hpk , (sk , , , and (BskSign pk
 to judge J. 




(B Bpk sk pkign EE S  is equal to . If they are equal, J 
continues with the next step, otherwise the case is dropped. In the same manner, 
J also verifies the encryption key  and its signature .  ( )Hpk
3. Judge J sends  to buyer B. (
Hpk
E W )
4. Buyer B decrypts ( )
Hpk
WE  using the corresponding private key Hsk  to obtain 
( ))W . 
5. Buyer B sends W to judge J. 
6. Judge J verifies W by encrypting it using key p , and then comparing the 
result to  he received from S. If they are equal, J goes on with the next 
step. Otherwise, B is found guilty. 
(W )
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 7. Judge J computes the permuted watermark ( )Wσ  and checks its existence in Y. 
If  is detected in Y, B is declared guilty. Otherwise, B is deemed innocent. (Wσ )
 
5.3 Bi-permutation Buyer-Seller Watermarking Protocol 
The first protocol requires customers to generate the watermark used in every 
transaction, whereas content provider only needs to permute the generated watermark. 
Considering the limited resources that customers have and the inconvenience caused, 
this protocol may hinder costumers from purchasing the digital content. In order to 
address this issue, we swap the tasks that content provider and customer must perform 
in our second protocol. As content providers, in general, have more computing 
resources and power than customers, it is more reasonable to have content providers 
do more work than customers.  
In this protocol, the watermark to be inserted is created by the content 
provider. The watermark will be then permuted twice, once by each party, in order to 
prevent both parties from acquiring the full knowledge of the watermark inserted. 
First, customer performs bit permutation on each element of the generated watermark 
to conceal it from the content provider. Consecutively, content provider will perform 
block permutation on the bit-permuted watermark to prevent customer from knowing 
the exact watermark inserted. The use two kinds of permutations explains why this 
protocol carries the term bi-permutation. 
 Bi-permutation buyer-seller watermarking protocol also consists of the same 
three subprotocols: content-watermarking protocol, copyright violator identification 
protocol, and dispute resolution protocol. The detail of each subprotocol is presented 
below. 
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 5.3.1  Content-Watermarking Protocol 
Let B be the customer wanting to purchase a copy of content X from S. 
1. After receiving a request from buyer B, seller S generates a watermark 
 specifically for this transaction. Then, S computes the 
signature of this watermark, 
( 1 2, , , nW w w w= … )
( )
Ssk
gn WSi , using his private key . Ssk
2.  Seller S sends both watermark W and its signature, ( )
Ssk
Sign W , to buyer B. 
3. Buyer B verifies the signature of the watermark by checking whether 
 is equal to W. If they are identical, B carries on with the next 
step. Otherwise, B can either request for a retransmission or cancel the 
transaction. 
( )(S Spk skE Sign W )
4. Buyer B chooses a random permutation Bσ , and uses it to perform bit 
permutation on each element of the watermark W. In other words, B computes 
( ) ( ) ( )( )1 2, , ,B B BW w w wσ σ σ′ = … n . 
B also encrypts Bσ  with his public key Bpk  to compute ( )Bpk BE σ . 
5. Buyer B generates a public-private key pair ( ),H Hpk sk  for the homomorphic 
cryptosystem, and then signs the public key to get ( )HpkBskgnSi . 
6. Buyer B encrypts W with Hpk  to obtain  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 2, , ,H H H Hpk pk pk pk nE W E w E w E w= … , 
and then signs it using his private key  to get Bsk ( )( )B Hsk pkSign E W . 
7. Buyer B encrypts W  with ′ Hpk  to obtain  
( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )1 2, , ,H H H Hpk pk B pk B pk B nE W E w E w E wσ σ σ′ = … , 
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 and then signs it using his private key sk  to get B ( )( )B Hsk pkSign E W ′ . 
8.  Buyer B sends Hpk , ( )Bsk HSign pk , ( )HpkE W , ( )( )B Hsk pkSign E W , ( )HpkE W ′ , 
, and (
B Hsk pk
Sign E W )( )′ ( )Bpk BE σ  to seller S. 
9. Seller S verifies the signature of encrypted watermark Sign  by 
checking if 
( )( )B Hsk pkE W
( )( )( )B B Hpk sk pkign E WE S  is equal to ( )WHpkE . If they are equal, S 
continues with the next step, otherwise the transaction is cancelled. In the same 
way, S also verifies the encryption key Hpk  against its signature , 






E W ′  against its signature 
. After the encryption key ( )( )B H W ′sk pkSign E Hpk  is verified, S encrypts W with 
Hpk  and compares the result to ( )WHpkE  in order to ensure that B did not 
change the watermark. 
10. Seller S finds all distinct elements of W and groups the indexes of elements that 
are identical into one set. S collects all these sets of indexes together and names 
it ( )part W . For example, let ( ), , , ,b c b a=W a , then its corresponding 
( )part W  is equal to the set { } { } { }{ }1,5 , 2, 4 , 3 . S then performs the same 
operation to ( )
Hpk
E W ′  in order to obtain the set ( )( )HpkE W ′part . Observe that 
 is actually equal to ( ))′( Hpkpart E W ( )part W ′  because every encryption 
function is injective, i.e. for all messages x and y, ( ) ( )
H Hpkpk
x y E= ⇔ x E y= . 
11. Seller S compares the set ( )part W  to the set ( )( )HpkE W ′part . Since B 
performs the same permutation Bσ  to every element of W to get W , the two ′
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 sets should be identical. Therefore, S only continues with the transaction if the 
two sets are identical. Otherwise, it is terminated as B has possibly changed the 
watermark. 
12. Seller S generates a fingerprint V, which is unique for each customer, and then 
inserts it into the original copy of the digital content X to get a fingerprinted 
copy X X V′ = ⊕ . 
13. Seller S chooses a random permutation Sσ , and uses it to permute the elements 
of the encrypted watermark ( )
Hpk
E W ′ . In other words, S computes 
  ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )1 2, , ,H H H HS pk S pk B pk B pk B nE W E w E w E wσ σ σ σ σ′ = …  
   ( )( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( )( )( )1 2, , ,H H HS Spk B pk B pk B nE w E w E wσ σσ σ σ= … Sσ  
   ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )1 2, , ,H S Spk B B B nE w w wσ σ σσ σ σ= … S  
   ( ) ( ) ( )( )( )1 2, , ,Hpk S B B B nE w wσ σ σ σ= … w  
   ( )( )
Hpk S
E Wσ ′= . 
The equation ( )( ) ( )( )H HS pk pk SE W E Wσ σ′ ′=
( )( ) ( )( )
 is true as  is of the form (
Hpk
E W ′)
( )( )( )pk B nE w wσ1 2, , ,H H Hpk B pk BE w Eσ σ … , so that interchanging 
encryption and permutation operations will give us the same result.  
14. Seller S inserts the double-permuted watermark into the fingerprinted content 
X ′  in encrypted domain. In other words, S first computes (
Hpk )E X ′ , and then 
inserts the encrypted double-permuted watermark to it, to obtain the encrypted 
and watermarked content X ′′ . 
( ) ( ) ( )( )
H H Hpk pk pk S
E X E X E Wσ′′ ′= ⊕ ′  
               ( )( )
Hpk S
E X Wσ′ ′= ⊕ . 
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 15. Seller S sends  to buyer B. (
Hpk
E X ′′)
16. Seller S stores identity of buyer B, BID , Hpk , , ( )Bsk HSign pk ( )HpkE W , 
, ( )( )B Hsk pkSign E W ( )HpkE W ′ , ( )( )WB HpkEskSign ′ , V, (Bpk BE )σ , and Sσ  as 
one entry in TableX. TableX contains one entry for each copy of X that S sells. 
17. Buyer B decrypts the encrypted content he receives from seller S using the 
corresponding decryption key Hsk  to obtain the watermarked content X ′′ . That 
is B computes 
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 2, , ,H Hsk pk S B B B nD E X X X V w w wσ σ σ σ′′ ′′= = ⊕ ⊕ … . 
Please refer to figure 5 for the idea underlying this content-watermarking protocol. 
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Figure 5. Content-watermarking protocol of the second protocol. 
 
5.3.2  Copyright Violator Identification Protocol 
1.  When seller S discovers an authorized copy of content X, say Y, he extracts the 
unique fingerprint embedded in Y using the watermark extraction function D, 
which takes both X and Y as its input. Let ( ),FOUND D X=V be the fingerprint 
detected in Y. 
Y
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 2.  Seller S correlates V  with every fingerprint stored in TableX in order to find 




V  be 
the fingerprint that has the highest correlation with V . If fingerprint V  
cannot be matched to any fingerprint in TableX, then the protocol fails. 
FOUND D
3.  Seller S retrieves all the information that corresponds to fingerprint MAX
B
V  from 
TableX. The information includes the identity of buyer, say ID , Hpk , 
, ( )
Bsk H
Sign pk ( )
Hpk
E W , ( )( )B Hsk pkSign E W , ( )HpkE W ′ , (B HpkE W )( )skSign ′ ,  
( )
Bpk B
E σ , and Sσ . 
Once seller S has the identity of buyer from whom the unauthorized copy was 
originated, S can appoint a judge J and proceed with dispute resolution protocol. 
 
5.3.3 Dispute Resolution Protocol 
Let J be the judge appointed by S to resolve the dispute between him and buyer B. 
1. Seller S sends Y, BID , Hpk , ( )Bsk HSign pk , ( )HpkE W , ( )( )B Hsk pkSign E W , 
( )
Hpk
E W ′ , ( )( )WB HpkEskSign ′ , ( )Bpk BE σ , and Sσ  to judge J. 
2. Judge J verifies the signature of encrypted watermark Si  by 
checking if 
( )( )B Hsk pkgn E W
( )( )( )B B Hpk sk pkign E WE S  is equal to ( )WHpkE . If they are equal, J 
continues with the next step, otherwise the case is dropped. In the same manner, 
J also verifies the encryption key Hpk  against its signature , and 






E W ′  against its signature 
. ( )( )B H W ′sk pkSign E
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 3. Judge J sends , ( )
Hpk
E W ( )
Hpk
E W ′ , and ( )
Bpk B
E σ  to buyer B. 
4. Buyer B decrypts ( )
Hpk
E W , ( )
Hpk
E W ′ , and ( )
Bpk B
E σ  using the corresponding 
private key Hsk  to obtain ( )( )WH HpkEskW D= , ( )( )H Hsk pkW D E W′ ′= , and 
( )( )BσB BpkB skD Eσ = , respectively. 
5. Buyer B sends W, W , and ′ Bσ  back to judge J. 
6. Judge J verifies W, W ′ , and Bσ  by encrypting them using key Hpk , and then 
comparing the results to ( )
Hpk
E W , ( )
Hpk
E W ′ , and ( )
Bpk B
E σ  he received from 
S. If they are equal, J goes on with the next step. Otherwise, B is found guilty. 
7. Judge J performs bit permutation Bσ  on every element of watermark W and 
compares the resulting data to W ′ . J proceeds to the next step only if they are 
identical. Otherwise, B is deemed guilty.  
8. Judge J computes the permuted watermark ( )S Wσ ′  and check its existence in 




5.4 Encryption-Based Buyer-Seller Watermarking Protocol 
Although we successfully shifted certain amount of works to content provider, 
customer, in the second protocol, is still required to perform bit permutation on every 
element of the generated watermark. In the context of digital movie, due to the huge 
volume of the content, this operation might still be significant to some theaters with 
very limited resources. Moreover, allowing customers to modify the generated 
watermark opens an opportunity for customers to swap it with some other watermarks 
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 which are more advantageous to them. In order to tackle this problem, we require 
content provider to perform a validity check after receiving the modified watermark 
from customers. However, since it is required that content provider does not know the 
exact operation done by customer, it is impossible for content provider to ensure that 
the watermark he receives from customer is indeed the permuted version of the one he 
originally generated. The customer is still able to swap the watermark with another 
watermark with a certain characteristic, although the swap does not make it any easier 
for him to break the system (please refer to Section 7.2 for details). In order to address 
these two problems, we propose the third protocol in which all watermarking 
operations are done on the seller side. It further minimizes the amount of work done 
by customer and at the same time eliminates the possibility of customer swapping the 
watermark. Nonetheless, this protocol still prevents content provider from knowing 
exactly the watermarked copy a customer receives.  
In this protocol, upon receiving a request from a customer, content provider 
first generates the information sequence to be carried by the watermark. The only 
action that a customer has to do is to sign this sequence to prevent content provider 
from swapping it. In general, this sequence is much shorter than the watermark 
frames, causing the amount of work done by customer in this protocol to be 
significantly smaller than that in the previous protocol. The watermark will be then 
produced by content provider using this sequence of information. To conceal the 
watermark from customer, content provider will substitute a number of its bits. The 
resulting data will be then inserted to the original content, which is encrypted using 
customer’s public key. As the result, it is the generated watermark, encrypted with 
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 customer’s private key, which will be inserted into the content, justifying the naming 
of our Encryption-Based Buyer-Seller Watermarking Protocol. 
 The same as the previous two protocols, our third buyer-seller watermarking 
protocol consists of the same three subprotocols: content-watermarking protocol, 
copyright violator identification protocol, and dispute resolution protocol. The detail 
of each subprotocol is presented below. 
 
5.4.1  Content-Watermarking Protocol 
Let B be the customer wanting to purchase a copy of content X from S. 
1. Upon receiving a request from buyer B, seller S generates a sequence 
 containing the information to be carried by the watermark. 
This sequence is created specifically for this transaction only. Then, S computes 
the signature of this bit sequence, 
( 1 2, , , pu u u u= … )
( )
Ssk
Sign u , using his private key . Ssk
2.  Seller S sends both bit sequence u and its signature, , to buyer B. ( )
Ssk
Sign u
3.  Buyer B verifies the signature by checking whether ( )( )S Spk skE Sign u  is equal to 
u. If they are identical, B carries on with the next step. Otherwise, B can either 
request for a retransmission or cancel the transaction. 






5. Buyer B sends his signature of sequence u, ( )
Bsk
Sign u , back to seller S.  
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 6. Seller S verifies the signature by checking whether ( )( )B Bpk skE Sign u  is equal to 
u. If they are identical, S continues with the next step. Otherwise, S cancels the 
transaction. 
7. Seller S selects a strictly increasing sequence of numbers s s , 
where 
( )1 2, , , qs s= …
q p<  and  for all 11 i is s +≤ < ≤ p { }1, 2, ,i∈ … q . Then, S projects 
sequence u on every index contained in s, i.e. S extracts from u the bit sequence 
( )1 2, , , qs s ssu u u= …u .  
8.  Seller S substitutes the bit sequence su with another q-bit sequence 
( 1 2ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ, , , q )s ssu u u u= … s . This can be done using the same concept as that of S-box 
used in Data Encryption Standard (DES) and Advanced Encryption Standard 
(AES). The idea is to split the sequence su into two parts, then take the decimal 
interpretation of these two binary sequences. Let the two numbers be r  and c . 
After that, retrieve the q-bit binary sequence stored in row r  and column  of 
a pre-generated table. The dimension of the S-box table depends on the value of 
q and how we split the sequence 
u u
uu c
su . The same S-box table can be used in every 
iteration of the protocol, i.e. the S-box table is fixed. 
 For example, assume ( )10011110s =
)
u and we split it right in the middle, i.e. the 
two parts are (  and 1001 ( )1110 , then ( )101001 9ur = =  and c . 
After that, do a table look-up to retrieve the binary string stored in row 9 and 
column 14 of the S-box table, and then use it as 
( )101110 14u = =
ˆ su . 
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 9. For all { }1, 2, ,∈ …i , seller S puts back every q ˆ
is
u  to position of sequence u, 




u  back to the position where 
is
u  is taken, to get a new 
information sequence ( )1 2ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ, , , pu u= …u u , where for all { }1, 2,∈ ,…i p ,  






u i s j q
u
u
 = ∈= 
…
. 
10. Seller S generates watermark ( )1 2, , , nw w= …W w  from the information 
sequence u u . This generation step is elaborated in Section 6.2.1. ( 1 2ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ, , , pu u= … )
11. Seller S generates a fingerprint V, which is unique for each customer, and then 
inserts it into the original copy of the digital content X to get a fingerprinted 
copy X X V′ = ⊕ . 
12. Seller S sends a request for a pair of public-private key to certification authority 
CA. This key pair will be used in the homomorphic cryptosystem.  
13. Upon receiving a request from S, CA generates a public-private key pair 
( ,H H )pk sk  for the specified homomorphic cryptosystem. CA encrypts the 
public key Hpk  using seller’s public key Spk  to get ( )Spk HE pk
CAsk
Sign
, and then signs 
the ciphertext using his private key  to obtain . 
Different from the public key, the private key 
CAsk ( )( )Spk HE pk
Hsk  is encrypted using buyer’s 
public key Bpk  to get ( )Bpk HE sk , and then the ciphertext is signed by CA using 
his private key  to get CAsk ( )( )BpkECAskgn HskSi .  
14. Certification Authority CA sends ( )
Spk H
E pk , ( )( )CA Ssk pk HSign E pk , ( )Bpk HE sk , 
and  to seller S.  ( )(CA Bsk pk HSign E sk )
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 15. Seller S verifies the signature of the encrypted public key Si  
by checking whether 
( )( )CA Ssk pk Hgn E pk
( )( )( )CA CA Spk sk pk HE Sign E pk  is equal to E p . In the 






E sk  against it signature . ( )( )CA Bsk pk Hgn E skSi
16. Seller S decrypts  using his private key sk  to retrieve the public key 








S SH sk p
pk D E= Hpk  to encrypt the fingerprinted content 
X ′
Hpk
 and get ( )E X ′ . 
17. Seller S inserts the watermark W generated earlier to the ciphertext of 
fingerprinted content ( )
Hpk
XE ′  to get the ciphertext of watermarked content 
(
Hpk
E X )′′ . It is assumed that the homomorphic cryptosystem is length-
preserving, i.e. plaintext has the same length as its corresponding ciphertext. In 
other word, the domain of its encryption function is the same as that of its 
decryption function. 
    ( ) ( )
H Hpk pk
E X E X′′ ′= ⊕W  
          ( ) ( )( )H H Hpk sk pkE X D E W′= ⊕  
          ( ) ( )( )H H Hpk pk skE X E D W′= ⊕  
          ( )( )H Hpk skE X D W′= ⊕  
18. Seller S sends ( )
Hpk
E X ′′ , ( )
Bpk H
E sk , and ( )( )CA Bsk pk HSign E sk  to buyer B. 
19. Seller S stores identity of buyer B, BID , u, ( )BskSign u , s, S-box, ( )Spk HE pk , 
, ( )( )CA Ssk pk HSign E pk ( )Bpk HE sk , ( )( )Bpk HskCAskSign E , and V as one entry in 
TableX. TableX contains one entry for each copy of X that S sells. 
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E s against its signature 
 by comparing ( )(CA Bsk pk HSign E sk ) )( )( )CApk HE S skCA Bsk pkign E  to . 
If they are identical, B continues with the next step. Otherwise, B may return the 




21. Buyer B decrypts ( )
Bpk H
k
( )(B Bpk Hsk
E s  using his private key sk  to recover the private 
key . B then uses this private key to decrypt the 
encrypted content 
B
)H sksk D E=
( )
Hpk
E X ′′  he received from seller S and obtain the 
watermarked content X ′′ . That is B computes 
( )( ) ( )H H Hsk pk skD E X X X V D W′′ ′′= = ⊕ ⊕ . 
Please refer to figure 6 for the idea underlying this content-watermarking protocol. 
 
Figure 6. Content-watermarking protocol of the third protocol. 
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 5.4.2  Copyright Violator Identification Protocol 
1.  When seller S discovers an authorized copy of content X, say Y, he extracts the 
unique fingerprint embedded in Y using the watermark extraction function D, 
which takes both X and Y as its input. Let ( ),FOUND D X=V  be the fingerprint 
detected in Y. 
Y
2.  Seller S correlates V  with every fingerprint stored in TableX in order to find 




V  be 
the fingerprint that has the highest correlation with V . If fingerprint V  
cannot be matched to any fingerprint in TableX, then the protocol fails. 
FOUND D
3.  Seller S retrieves all the information that corresponds to fingerprint MAXV  from 
TableX. The information includes the identity of buyer, say BID , u, ( )uBskSign , 
( )
Spk H
E pk , , ( )( )CA Ssk pk HSign E pk ( )Bpk HE sk , ( )( )CA Bsk pkSign E Hsk , S-box, and 
s.  
Once seller S has the identity of buyer from whom the unauthorized copy was 
originated, S can appoint a judge J and proceed with dispute resolution protocol. 
 
5.4.3 Dispute Resolution Protocol 
Let J be the judge appointed by S to resolve the dispute between him and buyer B. 
1. Seller S sends Y, BID , u, ( )BskSign u , s, S-box, , and (Bpk HE sk )
( )(CA Bsk pk HSign E sk )  to judge J. 
2. Judge J verifies the signature of sequence u,  by checking if ( )
Bsk
Sign u
( )(B Bpk sk )E Sign u  is equal to u. If they are equal, J continues with the next step, 
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 otherwise the case is dropped. J also verifies the signature Sign  
by encrypting it using CA’s public key 
( )( )CA Bsk pk HE sk
CApk , followed by comparing the result 











3. Judge J derives the sequence u  from the sequence u using set of indexes s and 
the substitution table S-box in the same way as seller S did. Please refer to 
Section 5.4.1 step 7-9 for details. 
ˆ
4. Judge J generates the watermark W from the sequence u  by following the same 
procedure as seller S did. The watermark construction process is explained in 
Section 6.2.1. 
ˆ
5. Judge J sends  to buyer B. (
Bpk H
E sk









7. Buyer B sends Hsk  back to judge J. 
8. Judge J verifies the key Hsk  he received from B by encrypting it using B’s 
public key B , and then comparing the result to (BpkE s  he received from 
S. If they are equal, J goes on with the next step. Otherwise, B is found guilty. 
9. Judge J decrypts the watermark W using the key Hsk  to compute .  
10. Judge J checks the existence of (
Hsk
D  in the unauthorized copy Y. If it is 





 6. CONSTRUCTION DETAILS 
For clarity and simplicity reasons, the details of cryptosystems and watermarking 
techniques were not included in the previous section. We assumed the existence of a 
cryptosystem that is privacy homomorphic with respect to the watermark insertion 
operation without mentioning any specific cryptosystems satisfying the desired 
property and explaining how the encryption and decryption are done. Neither did the 
explanation of each protocol contain any information about how a watermark is 
generated, embedded, and detected. 
 In this section, all this information will be provided in order to complete the 
explanation of our protocols. We will first introduce four cryptosystems that are 
privacy homomorphic with respect to either addition or multiplication, and then we 
explain briefly how encryption and decryption are done in each of the cryptosystems. 
In the second part of this section, we will present a spread-spectrum watermarking 
technique that can possibly be used in our protocols. The explanation will include 
watermark construction, insertion, and detection methods. 
  
6.1 Privacy Homomorphic Cryptosystem 
A cryptosystem is a privacy homomorphism with respect to operation op if and only if 
it has the property that 
( ) ( ) ( )1 2 1    k k 2kE m op m E m op E m=  
for any m  and  in the message space and for any k in the key space [40]. So, 
encrypting two messages first, followed by applying operation op on the ciphertexts 
will result in the same value as applying the operation op first, followed by encrypting 
the output. This property enables us to insert a watermark in the encrypted domain, so 
1 2m
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 content provider is able to insert the watermark into the content without knowing 
what is exactly being inserted. 
 RSA [45] and El Gamal [22] cryptosystems are two examples of 
cryptosystems that are homomorphic with respect to multiplication, whereas 
Niederreiter cryptosystem [17][42] is an example of a homomorphism with respect to 
addition. Combining the two operations, multiplication and addition, Paillier 
cryptosystem [43] is homomorphic from multiplication to addition. We explain 
briefly the encryption and decryption functions of each of these four cryptosystems 
below. 
 
6.1.1 RSA Cryptosystem 
RSA cryptosystem [45] is designed based on the factoring problem. As opposed to 
multiplication, which is easy, finding the factors of a given number is difficult, 
particularly when the number is a multiplication of two large prime numbers. The 
security of RSA cryptosystem relies on the difficulty of factoring such large integers. 
• Public key:  a large integer n pq= , where p and q are two large prime 
numbers, and an integer b, where 2 1( ) ( )( )b n p qφ 1≤ ≤ = − −  
and ( )( ) 1gcd ,b nφ = . 
• Private key: two prime factors of n, p and q, the Euler function of n, 
( ) ( )( )1n p qφ = − −1 , and the multiplicative inverse of b, 
( )( )1 mod  a b nφ−≡ . 
• Encryption: for any plaintext nx∈] , the corresponding ciphertext is  
( ) ( )mod  bE x x n= . 
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 • Decryption: for any ciphertext ny∈] , the corresponding plaintext is 
( ) ( )mod  aD y y n= . 
• RSA is a privacy homomorphism with respect to multiplication. 
For any two plaintexts 1x  and 2x , 
( ) ( ) (1 2 1 2 mod  bE x x x x n⋅ = ⋅ )  
    ( )1 2 mod  b bx x n= ⋅  
    ( )( ) ( )( )1 2mod  modb b  x n x n= ⋅  
    ( ) ( )1 2E x E x= ⋅ . 
 
6.1.2 El Gamal Cryptosystem 
El Gamal cryptosystem [22] is constructed with discrete logarithm problem as the 
underlying idea. It is easy to raise a number to certain power, but finding the 
logarithm of a number is much more difficult. The security of the El Gamal 
cryptosystem is provided by the difficulty of finding the unique discrete logarithm of 
a number modulo a prime number. 
• Public key:  a prime number p, a primitive element modulo p, g, and a number 
. ( )mod  ag pα =
• Private key: the discrete logarithm of α  modulo p, , 
where 
( )log mod  ga pα=
2 2a p≤ ≤ − . 
• Encryption: for any plaintext x p∈]  and a random k, the corresponding 
ciphertext is ( ) ( )2E x 1,y y= , where 
( )1 mod  ky g p=   
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 ( )2 mod  ky x pα= ⋅ . 
• Decryption: for any ciphertext ( )1 2,y y , the corresponding plaintext is 
( ) ( ) ( )11 2 2 1, maD y y y y p−= ⋅ od  . 
• El Gamal cryptosystem is a privacy homomorphism with respect to 
multiplication. 
For any two ciphertexts ( )1 2,y y  and ( )1 2,z z , where 
( )1 mod  ky g p=    ( )1 mod  mz g p=   
( )2 1 mod  ky x pα= ⋅    ( )2 2 mod  mz x pα= ⋅  
( )( ) ( )( )1 1 mod  modk my z g p g p⋅ = ⋅   
          ( )mod  k mg g p= ⋅  
          =  ( )mod  k mg p+
      ( )( ) ( )( )2 2 1 2mod  mok my z x p x pα α⋅ = ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ d   
            ( )1 2 mod  k mx x pα α⋅ ⋅= ⋅  
            ( ) ( )1 2 mod  k mx x pα += ⋅ ⋅  
  ( ) ( ) ( )1 2 1E x E x E x x⇒ ⋅ = ⋅ 2
 
6.1.3 Niederreiter Cryptosystem 
Niederreiter cryptosystem [17][42] is designed based on the concept of coding theory. 
The security of this cryptosystem lies on the difficulty of decoding process of a linear 
code. Niederreiter’s system uses a linear [ ], ,n k d  code C over finite field F , where n 
is the length of each codeword in C, k is the dimension of C, and d is the minimum 




 • Private key:  three matrices H, M, and P, where H is an (  parity-
check matrix of C, M is an arbitrary 
)n k n− ×
( ) ( )n kn k− × −  invertible 
matrix, and P is an arbitrary n n×  permutation matrix. 
• Public key: an (  matrix )n k n− × H MHP′ = . 
• Encryption: the admissible plaintexts are column vectors with hamming 
weight of at most ( )1 / 2= −t d   . The hamming weight of a 
vector x, ( )w x
H x
, is defined as the number of non-zero entries in x. 
For any plaintext x, the corresponding ciphertext is 
( )E x ′= ⋅ . 
• Decryption: given any ciphertext y, a column vector, first compute 
. Let 1y M y H P−′ = ⋅ = ⋅ ⋅ x x P x′ = ⋅ , then x′  can be viewed as 
an error vector. The decoding algorithm of C is applied to the 
syndrome y H x′ ′= ⋅  to yield the error vector x′ . The plaintext x 
is recovered by multiplying x′  to 1P− , i.e. 1x P x′⋅−= . 
• Niederreiter cryptosystem is a privacy homomorphism with respect to 
addition. 
For any two plaintexts 1x  and 2x , 
( ) ( )1 2 1 2E x x H x x′+ = ⋅ +  
      ( ) ( )1 2H x H x′ ′= ⋅ + ⋅  




 6.1.4 Paillier Cryptosystem 
Paillier cryptosystems [43] are constructed based on the Composite Residuosity Class 
Problem. Due to the complex nature of the problem, we are not going to discuss it any 
further. Interested readers may refer to [43] for further details about Composite 
Residuosity Class Problem. The encryption process of Paillier systems is very similar 
to the vote encryption process of Cohen and Fischer’s Cryptographically Secure 
Election Scheme [12]. However, Cohen and Fischer did not explain the corresponding 
decryption process, making Paillier’s systems a better choice for us to present in this 
report. We present an overview to each of the two cryptosystems proposed by Paillier 
below. 
 
6.1.4.1 First Cryptosystem 
• Private key:  two large prime numbers p and q, Carmichael’s function of 
, n pq= ( )lcm 1, 1p qλ = − − . 
• Public key: a number n pq= , a base g B , where 2*n∈ ⊆ ]
( )(gcd  mo 1L g nλ )2d  ,n =  and B is the set of elements of order 
nα  for 1,2, ,α λ= … . For each { }2 | 1n v∈ < ≡  mod  nu v , the 
function  is defined as L ( ) ( )1 /u= −L u n . 
• Encryption: for any plaintext x n<  and a random r n< , the corresponding 
ciphertext is 
( ) ( )2mod  x nE x g r n= ⋅  
• Decryption: for any ciphertext 2y n< , the corresponding plaintext is 
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• The first Paillier cryptosystem is privacy homomorphic from multiplication to 
addition. 
For any two ciphertexts ( ) (1 21 1 mod  x ng r n= ⋅ )E x  and 
( ) ( )2 22 2 mod  x nE x g r n= ⋅ , 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )1 22 21 2 1 2mod  modx xn nE x E x g r n g r n⋅ = ⋅ ⋅ ⋅   
        ( )1 2 21 2 mod  x xn ng r g r n= ⋅ ⋅ ⋅  
        ( ) ( )1 2 21 2 mod  nx xg r r n+ ⋅= ⋅  
        ( )1 2E x x= + . 
 
6.1.4.2 Second Cryptosystem 
• Private key:  two large prime numbers p and q, Carmichael’s function of 
, n pq= ( )lcm 1, 1p qλ = − − , and a number α , where 1 α λ≤ ≤ . 
• Public key: a number n pq= , a base g B , where 2*nα∈ ⊆ ] Bα  is the set of 
elements of order nα  for some 1 α λ≤ ≤ , and a function L 
defined on every { }2 | 1 mod  n v ≡u v∈ < n  as . ( )L u ( )1 /u n= −
• Encryption: for any plaintext x n<  and a random r n< , the corresponding 
ciphertext is 
( ) 2mod  x nrE x g n+=  
• Decryption: for any ciphertext 2y n< , the corresponding plaintext is 
92 











• The second Paillier cryptosystem is also privacy homomorphic from 
multiplication to addition. 
For any two ciphertexts ( ) 1 1 21 mod  x nrE x g n+=  and ( ) 2 2 22 mod  x nrE x g n+= , 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 2 22 21 2 mod  modx nr x nrE x E x g n g n+ +⋅ = ⋅   
           ( )1 1 2 2 2mod  x nr x nrg g n+ += ⋅  
            1 1 2 2 2mod  x nr x nrg n+ + +=
 ( ) ( )1 2 1 2 2mod  x x n r rg n+ + +=  
           ( )1 2E x x+= . 
 
6.1.5 Discussion 
The four cryptosystems mentioned above can be split into two groups according to the 
operations with respect to which they are homomorphic, addition and multiplication. 
Thus, the choice of cryptosystem to use determines the operation to perform in the 
watermark insertion process. If the cryptosystem is homomorphic to addition, then the 
watermark is inserted using addition operation. Similarly, multiplication operation is 
performed to embed the watermark if the cryptosystem is homomorphic to 
multiplication.  
 In each of the two groups, we have two cryptosystems to choose. When 
addition is preferred, we can use either Niederreiter’s system or Paillier’s system, 
whereas RSA and El Gamal are applicable when multiplication operation is more 
desirable. 
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  Niederreiter cryptosystem, which is based on the concept of coding theory, is 
faster than Paillier’s system with comparable security levels. Niederreiter’s system is 
reported to be 48 times faster than RSA cryptosystem, which simpler than Paillier’s 
system. However, Niederreiter’s system adds too much redundancy to the ciphertext 
and causes a severe expansion in the size of the ciphertext. Emmanuel and 
Kankanhalli [17] mentioned that expansion factor of Niederreiter’s system is at least 
ten. In terms of length expansion, Paillier’s system is much better as it only expands 
the length of ciphertext to at most twice the length of the plaintext. Nonetheless, it has 
higher time complexity compared to Niederreiter’s system. Either cryptosystems can 
be used according to needs and the availability of resources. When time is an 
important constraint, Neiderreiter’s system makes a better choice. Similarly, when 
space efficiency is more prioritized, Paillier’s system is definitely a wiser choice. 
 RSA and El Gamal cryptosystems perform similar set of operations in their 
encryption and decryption process. Both cryptosystems requires exponentiation and 
modulo operations.  Nevertheless, for a comparable security measure, El Gamal 
requires larger number of operations than RSA, and therefore requires more intensive 
computation than RSA [41][49]. As the consequence, El Gamal is slower and less 
efficient than RSA, although the difference is not significant on modern processors. In 
terms of length expansion, RSA is also superior to El Gamal cryptosystem. RSA does 
not cause any expansion as both plaintext and ciphertext are of the same size, whereas 
El Gamal produces ciphertext that is twice longer than its corresponding plaintext. 
Moreover, El Gamal requires the use of a random number in its encryption process. 
Therefore, it has a need for "good" randomness to generate a unique and 
unpredictable value for this parameter. Otherwise, it may open a chance for adversary 
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 to obtain the private key [49]. Therefore, RSA is a better choice than El Gamal when 
multiplication operation is preferred in the watermark embedding process. 
 When it does not really matter whether addition or multiplication is used in the 
watermark embedding process, RSA cryptosystem is the system we suggest. It is 
better established and more maturely studied than both Niederreiter’s and Paillier’s 
systems. Thus, its security is more guaranteed compared to that of the other two 
systems. RSA also eliminates the message expansion problem, which both 
Niederreiter’s and Paillier’s systems have. Unfortunately, RSA is much slower than 
Niederreiter’s system. 
 
6.2 Watermarking Scheme 
In our first two protocols, content provider performs permutation on the generated 
watermark in order to prevent customer from knowing the exact watermark being 
inserted into the content. It implies that we need a watermarking scheme that is linear. 
A watermarking scheme is linear if the watermark can be inserted element-wise, that 
is the insertion of a watermark element is independent of the insertion of other 
watermark elements. Let ( )1 2, , , mX x x x= …  denote the content to be watermarked,   
 be the watermark to insert with m , and ⊕  be the watermark 
insertion operation. A watermark scheme is linear if the watermark insertion step can 
be represented as 
( 1 2, , , nW w w w= … ) n≥
( )1 1 2 2 1, , , , , ,n n n mX X W x w x w x w x x+′ = ⊕ = ⊕ ⊕ ⊕… … . 
Although the watermarking scheme used in the third protocol need not be linear, the 
watermarking scheme presented in this section is linear to accommodate the other two 
protocols. 
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 As we can consider a video as a sequence of images, each called a frame, 
video watermarking process can be viewed as watermarking a large number of 
images. Therefore, in this section, we shall only explain how the watermarking 
scheme is applied to a single frame. The whole process can be repeated to many other 
frames according to content provider’s need. Content provider can choose to 
watermark either all frames or only a certain subset of those frames.  
 
6.2.1 Watermark Construction 
The watermarking construction technique presented in this section is taken from 
Emmanuel and Kankanhalli’s work [17].  
The watermark construction process starts with a process that maps the 
information sequence  u u , ( 1 2, , , pu u= … ) { }0,1iu ∈ to a sequence a a , 
where for all 
( )1 2, , , pa a= …
{ }1, 2,∈ …,i p  
1    if 0







 The resulting sequence a is then spread using the chip rate C  to obtain the 
spread sequence b of length C
r
r p× . The chip rate C  and the length of information 
sequence p are selected in such a way that C p
r
r n× = . The spread sequence b is 
constructed as follows: 
( ):   ,   1i j rj b a jC i j C∀ = ≤ < + r  
 The spreading provides redundancy and improves the robustness to 
geometrical attacks such as cropping. After spreading the information sequence, we 
multiply the spread sequence with a pseudorandom noise sequence z, where 
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 { }1,1iz ∈ − . The multiplication will be followed by amplification of the result by a 
scaling factor 0γ >  to obtain the watermark ( )1 2, , , nw w= …W w , where 
{ }1, 2, , :   i ii n w ib zγ∀ ∈ =…  
The scaling factor γ  is chosen in such a way that the watermark still remains 
detectable and, at the same time, invisible in the watermarked frames.  
 
6.2.2 Watermark Embedding 
We use the same watermarking technique as the one used by Memon and Wong [40], 
which is the spread-spectrum watermarking technique proposed by Cox et al. [14].  
  Let X be the video to watermark, I be the set of indexes indicating the subset 
of the video frames to watermark, and iX  be the i-th frame of the content X. We apply 
the watermarking scheme proposed by Cox et al. [14] to insert the watermark 
generated into each frame iX , i I∈ .  
 In Cox.et al.’s scheme, the content frame iX  is first compressed by 
performing two-dimensional Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT). The n largest DCT 
AC coefficients are then extracted for watermarking. Results reported using 1000 
DCT AC coefficients show the technique to be remarkably robust against various 
image processing operations, and also after printing and rescanning [40]. Let 
{ }1 2, , , nx x x…  denote the n largest DCT AC coefficients. Each watermark element  
is embedded to coefficient  
iw
ix  using the suitable insertion formula to yield the 
modified coefficients  ix′ . The choice of insertion formula depends on the type of 
cryptosystem used. If the cryptosystem is a homomorphism with respect to addition, 
we can simply add the watermark to the coefficients, that is to compute 
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 i i ix x w′ = + . 
However, if the cryptosystem used is homomorphic with respect to multiplication, we 
need to first add 1 to the watermark elements before multiplying it to the coefficients, 
that is to use the following formula: 
( )1i i ix x w′ = × + . 
 Observe that we do not multiply the watermark element by a scaling factor in 
both formulas. It is because the scaling of watermark element is carried out during the 
watermark construction process. Please refer to the previous subsection for details of 
this process. 
 After the modified coefficients { }1 2, , , nx x x′ ′ … ′  are computed, the inverse of 
two-dimensional DCT is performed on these coefficients in order to obtain the 
watermarked frame iX ′ . The whole embedding process is repeated to insert the 
watermark to other video frames. 
 
6.2.3 Watermark Detection 
In this section, we shall see how we can determine whether a video frame contains a 
watermark W. In other words, we shall discuss about the inverse of watermark 
embedding operation explained in Section 6.2.2. The watermark detection is done in a 
non-blind manner, i.e. it is performed with the existence of the original copy of the 
content. The information presented below is taken from [40]. 
 Suppose we want to check the existence of watermark W in a video frame Y . 
First, the same two-dimensional DCT as explained in the previous subsection is 




 let’s denote it by { }1 2, , , ny y y… .  We then subtract these values from the n largest 
DCT AC coefficients of the corresponding frame iX  of the original content, 
{ }1 2, , , nx x x… , i.e. to compute ( )1 2, , , nt t= …T t  where 
{ }1, 2, , :   i n ix y∀ … i it∈ = . −
After T is computed, we compute the correlation between W and T. This correlation 
value indicates the confidence measure on the existence of watermark W in Y .  i
 
7. ANALYSIS 
In the proposed protocols, we combine several different concepts together in order to 
achieve our objectives. Therefore, the properties of the protocols highly depend on 
those of the building blocks used to construct them. In this section, we shall discuss 
how the properties of the underlying concepts are utilized in order to fulfill the 
requirements mentioned in the earlier part of this report. We shall first see some 
characteristics which are common to those three protocols, and then we shall examine 
how each of these three protocols solves the customer’s right problem in its own way. 
 
Security 
The security of the three proposed protocols relies on the security of the underlying 
cryptosystem, watermarking scheme, and the permutation.  
The cryptosystem that we recommend, RSA cryptosystem, is very well-
established and maturely studied, causing its security to be more reliable compared to 
the other homomorphic cryptosystems. RSA is believed to be secure if the proper 
parameters are used and it is employed properly. The choice of the two prime 
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 numbers is highly important in RSA. It is reported that the length of each prime 
should be at least 1024 bits in order to achieve a guaranteed level of security [49]. 
RSA also eliminates the message expansion problem, which the other alternatives 
have.  
Although people are still questioning the ability of many watermarking 
schemes to withstand many different known attacks due to the inexistence of standard 
performance measure, Cox et al.’s watermarking technique used in our three protocols 
is one of the best known and has been shown to be remarkably robust against 
common image processing attacks and even several cycles of analog to digital 
conversions. The robustness of the scheme critically depends on the availability of the 
original content which can be used to undo operations like scaling, cropping, 
rotations, and some other operations prior to watermark detection step [40]. 
The choice of permutations used in the first two protocols also plays an 
important role in ensuring the security of the protocols. The permutations must be 
chosen in such a way that the permuted watermark appears random and it does not 
expose any information about the original watermark. The number of watermark 
elements and the size of each element should be designed to be large enough in order 




Traceability, Collusion Resistance, and No Framing by Malicious Users  
Traceability is achieved in the three proposed protocols by inserting a unique 
fingerprint, denoted by V, to each copy of the content. It is the responsibility of 
content provider to ensure that each fingerprint inserted is unique for each customer 
100 
 and to maintain a list of fingerprints used and their respective owners, so that it 
enables him to trace the source of an unauthorized distribution act from the fingerprint 
detected in an illegal copy of the content. It does not do any good for content provider 
not to perform the fingerprinting properly. Thus, it can be assumed that content 
provider inserts the proper fingerprint in a proper manner in order to guarantee the 
traceability. 
In order to prevent a coalition of users from colluding their copies to remove 
the fingerprint or to frame another user, we can encode the fingerprints using 
collusion-resistant codes. Boneh and Shaw [2] have shown a way to construct a code 
that can satisfy these requirements. Their c-secure and c-frameproof code can be 
employed in order to ensure that content provider is able to identify at least one of the 
c colluders without falsely accusing an innocent user. The large size of those codes is 
not a problem in the context of video fingerprinting. The huge volume of the content 
provides a space for embedding a lengthy fingerprint. 
 
Anonymity and Unlinkability 
In order to provide anonymity, we can require each customer to use an anonymous 
certificate instead of the standard public-key certificate in every transaction he makes. 
Anonymous certificate is basically a public-key certificate which does not reveal the 
identity of the owner. Instead, a pseudonym is used to identify the owner. Each 
customer who does not wish their identity to be disclosed is able to request for an 
anonymous certificate to certification authority (CA), and then use it during 
authentication process preceding a transaction. In this case, content provider will not 
know the true identity of the customer. The true identity of customer is only known by 
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 CA. The true identity of a customer is only exposed when he is suspected of an illegal 
copying and distribution in order to facilitate the dispute resolution protocol. The 
possibility of coalition between CA and content provider can be ruled out as CA is 
assumed honest and trustworthy. Otherwise, there is even no public-key infrastructure 
that is secure to be used in the protocols. 
 Nonetheless, anonymous certificate and pseudonym do not prevent people 
from relating two different copies of digital content purchased under the same 
pseudonym. To solve this problem, we need to require the anonymous certificate and 
pseudonym to be used for a limited number of transactions only. Customers need to 
request for a new anonymous certificate and a new pseudonym on a regular basis in 
order to securely hide their identity. 
 
Binding mechanism 
Unbinding problem, caused by failure to provide proper mechanism to bind a 
generated watermark to a specific digital content it is inserted, can be avoided by 
inserting to each copy of the content a watermark that contains the identification of 
each content copy. It can be done by including a time stamp indicating the time of 
transaction, a nonce, the title of the content, and the identity of parties involved in the 
transaction into the watermark to be inserted. This information is used to differentiate 
each pair of copies purchased by the same customer. This way, content provider will 
not be able to transplant a watermark detected in a pirated copy into other copies of 
(possibly higher-priced) digital contents in order to get more compensation from a 
guilty customer.  
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 No Additional Trusted Third Party  
The most distinctive feature of our protocols that differentiates our protocols from 
other existing solutions is the absence of watermark certification authority (WCA). 
None of our protocols requires the involvement of an additional trusted third party, 
other than CA and the arbiter, in any stage of a transaction. As mentioned earlier, the 
assumption on arbiter’s and CA’s honesty is acceptable since it also exists in the 
traditional fingerprinting and watermarking schemes. Moreover, CA is a party 
guaranteeing the secrecy of private keys in any public-key infrastructure, thus it is 
definitely trustworthy and reliable. In our protocols, the watermark is generated by 
either customer or content provider. Therefore, we can now rule out the possibility of 
coalition between seller and WCA existing in other protocols. 
 Despite the removal of WCA role in our protocols, we take into consideration 
the underlying reason why WCA was, in the first place, introduced. In the first 
protocol, we solve the problem of watermarks that are approximately invariant to 
permutation by requiring content provider to check the validity of watermark 
generated by customer. In the second protocol, watermark generation is performed by 
content provider. So, it is clear that he will not produce a watermark which is 
approximately invariant to permutation as it means helping customer to remove the 







 7.1 Memon and Wong’s Buyer-Seller Watermarking Protocol 
without Watermark Certification Authority 
Being a variant of Memon and Wong’s protocol [39][40], our first protocol solves the 
customer’s right problem in the same way as their protocol does. By removing the 
watermark certification authority role and shifting its task to customer, we reduce the 
number of parties knowing the watermark being generated to the minimum, which is 
one. So, only customer knows the watermark generated. Since the generated 
watermark is sent to content provider in encrypted form and content provider does not 
know the corresponding private key, content provider does not have any knowledge 
about this watermark. 
 Upon receiving the encrypted watermark, content provider checks the validity 
of watermark by counting the number of different permutations to which it is not 
invariant. It is done in order to avoid the use of watermarks which enable customer to 
easily estimate. So, it is clear that content provider will not be benefited if he skips 
this step. Only if the watermark is acceptable, content provider will continue with the 
transaction by permuting the encrypted watermark, followed by embedding the 
permuted watermark into the content in encrypted domain. It is against content 
provider’s interest not to perform the permutation in an appropriate manner as it 
might facilitate customer to estimate the embedded watermark more easily. Swapping 
the watermark with some other watermark will not be advantageous to content 
provider, either. A swap will only result in his inability to prove an illegal act of a 
customer. So, it is content provider’s responsibility to choose a good random 
permutation and to insert the permuted watermark in the right manner. Content 
provider should also keep this permutation secret, lest it be known to customer.  
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  In this protocol, it is impossible for content provider to reproduce copies of 
content containing a user’s watermark since he has no knowledge about the user-
generated watermark. He has his secret permutation and the encrypted watermark, but 
he does not have the private decryption key. Assuming the public-key cryptosystem 
and its infrastructure are secure, there is no way for content provider to decrypt it to 
obtain the watermark. Thus, content provider cannot frame a customer by distributing 
illicit copies of content containing the customer’s watermark. For the same reason, a 
guilty customer cannot deny his unlawful deed by claiming that the unauthorized copy 
is created by content provider. On the other hand, customer will not be able to remove 
the watermark inserted without rendering the content useless for he does not know the 
permutation function applied to the generated watermark before embedding process. 
Neither content provider nor customer knows the exact watermark being embedded to 
the content. It is also against his own interest for customer to present a random 
watermark to the arbiter during dispute resolution process because it only causes 
himself to be considered guilty. Thus, it is guaranteed that content provider can prove 
a piracy act of a customer to a third party with no possibility of the accused denying 
his act. In other words, no framing and no repudiation requirements are satisfied. 
 Unfortunately, in this protocol, customers need to generate the watermark used 
in every transaction, which, up to certain degree, causes inconvenience to them. 
Moreover, they might need to repeat the process for few times if content provider 
rejects their watermarks. Although customers only need to communicate with seller in 
a transaction, they have to take part in dispute resolution process. If customers use the 
same public-private key pair in every transaction, they only need to keep one 
decryption key. However, the large amount of data encrypted using the same key 
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 might help content provider to discover the private key. Therefore, customers need to 
store the list of decryption keys, each is needed to decrypt a content copy he 
purchased.  In conclusion, customer’s convenience is not provided by this protocol. 
 
7.2 Bi-permutation Buyer-Seller Watermarking Protocol 
In our first protocol, customers are required to generate the watermark used in every 
transaction, whereas content provider only needs to permute the generated watermark. 
Considering the limited resources that customers have and the inconvenience caused, 
we swap the tasks that content provider and customer must perform in our second 
protocol.  
In this protocol, content provider creates the watermark to be inserted upon 
receiving a transaction request from a customer. The generated watermark will be 
then transferred to the customer for modification. The requesting customer only needs 
to perform bit permutation on every element of the watermark. In order to prevent 
content provider from guessing the permutation correctly, the length of watermark 
element should be designed to be long enough. Each element of the watermark should 
at least have 128 bits of precision to rule out the possibility of brute force attacks. It is 
against his own interest to skip this step or not to perform it in the right way. 
Therefore, it is customer’s responsibility to choose a good permutation and hide the 
permutation safely.  
The permuted watermark will be encrypted using the public key of the 
homomorphic cryptosystem and sent to content provider. Now, content provider has 
to group the indexes of all identical elements together. The grouping of the encrypted 
and permuted watermark is compared to that of the original watermark. This step is 
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 done in order to prevent customer from swapping the watermark and presenting a 
random watermark. Since the same bit permutation is performed on all elements and 
encryption function is injective, these two groupings should be identical. If they are 
different, content provider can conclude that the customer has changed the watermark. 
So, by swapping the watermark with a random watermark, customer will not be able 
to cheat content provider for it will cause the transaction to be terminated. However, 
content provider will not be able to tell if customer swap the watermark with another 
watermark having the same grouping. It will only be discovered by an arbiter in a 
dispute resolution process as arbiter will repeat the permutation process and compare 
the result to what content provider has kept. It is, nonetheless, a useless effort done by 
the customer. It will not benefit him in any way. Watermarks with the same groupings 
also have the same set of permutations to which they are not invariant. Thus, changing 
the watermark with another one having the same grouping will help customer to 
estimate neither the permutation performed by content provider nor the watermark 
inserted to the content. We can therefore rule out this kind of swapping. 
Once content provider validated the permuted watermark, he will permute the 
order of the watermark elements and insert it in encrypted form. In order to prevent 
customer from guessing this permutation correctly, we require the number of elements 
to be large enough. It is against content provider’s interest not to perform the 
permutation in an appropriate manner as it might facilitate customer to estimate the 
embedded watermark more easily. Swapping the watermark with some other 
watermark will not be advantageous to content provider, either. It will only result in 
his inability to prove an illegal act of a customer. So, it is content provider’s 
responsibility to choose a good random permutation and to insert the permuted 
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 watermark in the right manner. Content provider should also keep this permutation 
secret, so that it is not known to the customer. 
It is clear that content provider is only able to reproduce copies of content 
containing a user’s watermark if he knows the bit permutation performed by the 
customer. However, this permutation is kept secret. Content provider has his secret 
permutation, the original watermark, and the encrypted bi-permuted watermark, but 
he has no knowledge about customer’s permutation function. Assuming the public-
key cryptosystem and its infrastructure are secure, there is no way for content 
provider to recover the bi-permuted watermark. Thus, content provider cannot frame a 
customer by distributing illicit copies of content containing his watermark. For the 
same reason, a guilty customer cannot deny his unlawful act by claiming that the 
unauthorized copy is originated by content provider. On the other hand, customer will 
not be able to remove the watermark inserted without rendering the content useless 
for he knows only the original watermark and his secret permutation, but not the 
seller’s permutation function. Neither content provider nor customer knows the exact 
watermark being embedded to the content. Again, it is not advantageous for customer 
to present a random watermark or a different permutation function to the arbiter 
during dispute resolution process because it only causes himself to be considered 
guilty. Thus, it is guaranteed that content provider can prove a piracy act of a 
customer to a third party with no possibility of the accused denying his act. In other 
words, no framing and no repudiation requirements are satisfied. 
 In terms of customer’s convenience, our second protocol is better than the 
previous protocol as customers only need to perform bit permutation on watermark 
elements, instead of generating the watermark itself. Additionally, they will never be 
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 required to repeat the permutation process. The same as before, customers only need 
to communicate with seller in a transaction, but they have to take part in dispute 
resolution process. A single decryption key will only work if customers use the same 
public-private key pair in every transaction. However, the large amount of data 
encrypted using the same key might help content provider to discover the private key. 
Therefore, we can say that this protocol only satisfies the customer’s convenience 
requirement partially. 
 
7.3 Encryption-Based Buyer-Seller Watermarking Protocol 
In order to further minimize the amount of work done by customer and to eliminate 
the possibility of customer swapping the watermark, we propose the third protocol in 
which all watermarking operations are done on the seller side.  
In this protocol, upon receiving a request from a customer, content provider 
first generates the information sequence to be carried by the watermark. The only 
action that a customer has to do is to sign this sequence to prevent content provider 
from swapping it. If it is not signed, content provider can cheat by reversing the 
watermarking process. He can choose a random watermark to insert and then encrypt 
it. The ciphertext can be then used to find the corresponding information sequence. 
The random watermark is inserted to the copy of content sent to customer. This way, 
he knows what is exactly being embedded to the customer’s copy and he can illegally 
distribute copies of content containing this random watermark. During a dispute 
resolution process, he can claim that this random watermark is the encryption of its 
ciphertext using customer’s private key, and thus he successfully frames a customer. 
Therefore, it is very important to have customer verify and sign the information 
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 sequence. It is disadvantageous for customer to skip this step or not to perform this 
step in the right way. 
After receiving the signature of the sequence, content provider will substitute a 
number of bits of the information sequence to conceal it from customer.  The number 
of bits substituted should be large enough to prevent customer from performing brute 
force attack to find the substitution. On the other hand, it should not be larger than the 
number of preserved bits. Otherwise, content provider can reverse the watermarking 
process as shown above to break the system. We can ask arbiter to check this number 
to avoid such attack. If the number of bits substituted is too large, arbiter must drop 
the charges on the accused customer. It is also very important to keep secret the 
substitution table and the positions of bits changed. Otherwise, customer will get full 
knowledge of the exact watermark inserted and this step is useless. Hence, content 
provider should ensure this step is carried out in the right way.  
The substitution process will be then followed by content provider producing 
the corresponding watermark using this sequence of information. The generated 
watermark will be then inserted to the content that has been encrypted using the 
public key of the homomorphic cryptosystem. As the result, it is the generated 
watermark, encrypted with the private key, which will be inserted into the content. 
Content provider might want to encrypt the substituted watermark before embedding 
it into the content. However, it will cause him not to be able to prove a piracy act of a 
customer to a third party. Exchanging the watermark to insert with another watermark 
will also result in the arbiter’s failure in detecting the legitimate watermark. Thus, 
content provider has no better choice than performing this step according to the 
convention.  
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 In this protocol, the watermark is magically encrypted with the private key of 
the homomorphic cryptosystem by inserting it to an encrypted content. It is done 
without having to expose the key to content provider, who performs the insertion. 
Assuming the public-key cryptosystem and its infrastructure are secure, content 
provider has no way to obtain the private key, and therefore is unable to replicate the 
watermark inserted to the customer’s copy. Although he is in charge of all 
watermarking process and knows the originally generated watermark, it is impossible 
for him to reproduce copies of content containing a user’s watermark, which implies 
that he cannot frame an innocent customer. For the same reason, a guilty customer 
cannot deny his unlawful act by claiming that the unauthorized copy is originated by 
content provider. In other words, no framing and no repudiation requirements are 
satisfied. 
On the other hand, customer will not be able to remove the watermark inserted 
without rendering the content useless because he knows nothing about the positions of 
substituted bits and seller’s substitution table. Consequently, neither content provider 
nor customer knows the exact watermark being embedded to the content. During 
dispute resolution process, a customer might want to present a random bit sequence 
instead of the information sequence he received from content provider. Nevertheless, 
it is not advantageous to do so for it only causes himself to be considered guilty. Thus, 
content provider can definitely prove a piracy act of a customer to a third party.  
During dispute resolution process of this protocol, costumer is required to 
expose the private key of the homomorphic cryptosystem to the arbiter. Thus, we 
require the public-private key pair used in every transaction to be distinct. With 
customer’s convenience in mind, we let certification authority (CA) generate this pair 
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 of keys on customer’s behalf. Although both keys are sent to content provider, 
assuming the public-key cryptosystem and its infrastructure are secure, he will not be 
able to obtain the private key as it is encrypted using customer’s public key. We also 
rule out the possibility of collusion between CA and content provider by assuming 
CA’s honesty. Otherwise, there will be no secure public-key infrastructure. 
It is easy to observe that our third protocol is better than the previous two 
protocols in terms of the amount of work that customer does. In this protocol, the only 
thing that customer must do is to sign the generated information sequence. In general, 
this sequence is much shorter than the watermark frames, causing the amount of work 
done by customer in this protocol to be significantly smaller than that in the previous 
protocols. Moreover, customers only need to communicate with seller during a 
transaction. However, similar to the other two protocols, they have to take part in 
dispute resolution process and a single decryption key will only work if customers use 
the same public-private key pair in every transaction, at the cost of helping content 
provider to discover the private key. Therefore, this protocol does not fully satisfy the 











Please refer to the following table for the comparison among our three protocols. 











Traceability Yes Yes Yes 
No Repudiation Yes Yes Yes 
No Framing Yes Yes Yes 
Collusion Resistance Yes Yes Yes 
Anonymity Yes Yes Yes 
Unlinkability Yes Yes Yes 
No Additional TTP (WCA) Yes Yes Yes 
No Unbounding Problem Yes Yes Yes 
Customer’s Convenience    
• Not watermark generator No Yes Yes 
• Number of parties to 
communicate with 
1 1 1 
• No participation in 
dispute resolution 
No No No 
• Single decryption key in 
multiple purchases No No No 
 
We can see clearly from the table that our proposed protocols successfully 
solve customer’s right problem, which indicated by the fulfillment of no repudiation 
and no framing requirements, without having to rely on any additional trusted third 
party.  
The first protocol shifts the watermark generator role to the buyer, causing the 
seller to have a smaller amount of computation to perform. Both the watermark and 
the key pair used in a transaction are provided by the buyer. Thus, this protocol is 
suitable in a scenario where seller has a limited amount of resources and the 
distribution network is relatively larger.  In contrast to the first protocol, the third 
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 protocol requires the seller to perform the watermark generation process. 
Additionally, the seller has to handle the public-private key pair used in the 
homomorphic cryptosystem, as well. Therefore, we should only use this protocol in a 
situation where the amount of resources the seller has is relatively larger and the size 
of distribution network is quite small. The second protocol is proposed as the middle-
of-the-road solution. This protocol distributes the amount of computation to the seller 
and the buyer more evenly. The seller is responsible of generating the watermark 
used, whereas the buyer is required to handle the cryptographic key pair. 
Consequently, this protocol makes a good choice in a case where both parties have 




 8. CONCLUSION 
Three new buyer-seller watermarking protocols were presented in order to solve the 
customer’s right problem in the conventional digital fingerprinting without having to 
hinge on the trustworthiness of watermark certification authority (WCA). In these 
protocols, WCA no longer takes part in any stage of the protocols and watermark 
generation is performed by either customer or content provider.  
The first protocol, a variant of Memon and Wong’s protocol, combines 
permutation and privacy homomorphic cryptosystem to prevent both buyer and seller 
from knowing the exact watermark inserted, whereas the use of watermark invariant 
to permutation is avoided by a watermark validity checking. In the second protocol, 
customer’s right problem is tackled by using two kinds of permutations and 
homomorphic encryption system, which are used to conceal the watermark embedded. 
The validity of watermark is guaranteed as it is generated by content provider. In the 
third protocol, substitution, instead of permutation, is used along with homomorphic 
cryptosystem to achieve secrecy of watermark inserted. The problem of invariant 
watermark does not exist since the protocol uses no permutation.  
Our protocols successfully eliminate the user-framing and false implication 
problem. Simultaneously, they enable content provider to prove customer’s piracy act 
to a third party with no possibility of guilty users denying his wrongdoing. 
Nevertheless, they fail to provide a full convenience to customers. Although now 
customers need to communicate with only one party, they have to participate in 
dispute resolution process. Moreover, they need to maintain a list of decryption keys 
used in all transaction they made. Finding a solution to these two shortcomings will 
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